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Prologue 
 
The goal of this paper is to review the policy tools currently in use to influence land development in Oregon’s 
growth management system and the Netherlands’ spatial planning system, to chart some movements in policy 
direction of both systems, to explore ways in which the systems are similar, and ultimately to hypothesize 
about the potential for each system to learn from the other.  The Prologue will discuss the reasons for 
choosing this subject, acknowledge some fundamental differences and establish the basis for comparison. 
 
•  The Basis for Comparison 
 
These are two highly regarded planning systems that have often been pointed to as models.  There are 
very significant differences between them, but also some common points (including common goals, 
approaches, techniques and challenges) that enable comparison.  This paper will not attempt to 
advocate either or both systems, though the analysis is based on the belief that these two systems are 
relatively successful in guiding development.  Instead, it will seek to understand how both systems 
operate, their shortcomings, and the potential for improvement. 
 
This paper discusses the applied aspects of strategic planning, something for which both of these 
places are known.  Within the U.S., Oregon is often considered to be the most successful growth 
management program.  The Netherlands, for its part, is often considered a planner’s paradise: 
 
“Foreign observers will need little convincing of the merits of Dutch planning.  They will want 
to know whether routine explanations (small country, industrious, disciplined people hardened 
by the perennial fight against the sea) hold any water, and they will want to know where to 
look for the bag of tricks of Dutch planners” (Faludi, xiii).   
 
This paper seeks to look into the “bag of tricks” of both Oregonian and Dutch planners.  It is quite 
common for American planners to wonder aloud why the U.S. seems unable to address some of the 
worst problems plaguing our cities and countryside, while European countries take strong action to do 
so.  Looking to the Netherlands for planning knowledge is hardly a surprise.  What could come as a 
surprise to Americans, however, is that the interest in reciprocated.  Planning in the Netherlands is 
undergoing rapid change.  It is, in fact, coming closer (at least a little) to resembling the planning 
system of some places in the United States.  Meanwhile, Oregon has taken steps to create a planning 
system capable of meeting its state goals.  Faludi and Van der Valk see a strong parallel between 
Dutch strategic planning and the U.S. regional/state growth management movement (ibid., 2).  
 
Many U.S. scholars have made pilgrimages to Europe to study urban issues.  This essay comes close on the 
heels of two recent books written by Timothy Beatley and Pietro Nivola, both of whom explore the potential   5
of incorporating European planning techniques into US planning practice.  Both of these works consider an 
exchange between Europe as a whole and the United States as a whole.  This essay is the first study of which I 
am aware to apply that question specifically to one U.S. state and one European country.  This approach 
seems logical because in the U.S., innovative planning is happening on the state and local levels.  Because 
state systems are quite different, it is interesting to explore at that level. 
 
Acknowledging the Differences 
 
Pietro Nivola identifies a number of important differences between European countries and the United States 
that, independent of any public policy actions, have been highly deterministic of land use patterns.  These 
differences, coupled with a radically different perception of the role of government, appear to make it unlikely 
that many European techniques will ever be adopted in the U.S.  One enormous difference is the amount of 
land that is available for development.  Obviously, the Dutch have to be more careful with their land, 
considering that there are 15 million people living in a 400 square kilometer area (Beatley, 32).  In the U.S. in 
general, and Oregon in particular, land is much more abundant (approximately 2.5 million Oregonians occupy 
an area much larger than the Netherlands).  Also, in the U.S., there is already a preponderance of exurban 
development that will not be affected by growth management techniques.  Why would, or should, U.S. states 
or regions think about adopting aspects of the Dutch approach when land is abundant and urban sprawl is 
already thoroughly established?   
 
Cultural and political factors also cast doubt on the viability of European planning techniques employed in the 
U.S.  The heterogeneity of the U.S. population, age demographics and concentrations of poverty and crime in 
center cities are all obstacles.  Finally, the inertia of established government practices that foster the long-
standing deconcentration of U.S. urban areas poses another serious challenge to change at the national level.  
Nivola is skeptical of states and local governments’ power to produce serious change without changes at the 
level of the federal government.  
 
These obstacles to exchanging techniques and approaches also work in the opposite direction.  For the same 
types of reasons, it would be unimaginable in the Netherlands to allow the type of free market development 
that occurs in the U.S. 
 
The gulf separating Oregonian and Dutch planning is vast.  In the Netherlands, planning was born as a result 
of the need to address issues related to water, while Oregonian planning resulted largely from threats to 
farmland.  Besides, the Netherlands is a national entity, while Oregon is an intermediary level of government.  
All of these differences mean that many of the tasks that planners undertake are different as well.  However, 
this paper is exploring planning approaches (how the systems operate), not planning challenges (such as   6
preparing land for development or protecting sensitive areas).  Despite the differences, each place has created 
a structure and tools to respond to planning challenges.  It is those structures and tools that will be explored.  
 
Commonalities 
 
Fundamentally, both systems are similar in that they have achieved sufficient consensus supporting planning 
to allow the systems to be created.  Both have common goals, including reducing car mobility, fostering 
compact cities and protecting the environment.  More recently, the Netherlands and Oregon have both taken 
steps that bring them closer together in their approaches to land use planning.  
 
Several trends in the Netherlands are bringing it closer to Oregon’s approach.  Dutch planning is now 
emphasizing the same type of comprehensive, holistic approach that characterizes Oregonian planning 
(Beatley, 416).  Collaboration between government and business, another Oregonian feature, is becoming 
more common in Europe.  Greater emphasis is being placed on the local and regional levels for planning in 
the Netherlands (another similarity).  Finally, the Netherlands has pursued an increasingly market-oriented 
approach to planning.  While still worlds away from the U.S. system, the Dutch are paying attention to the 
potential of introducing flexible, free market techniques into their planning system.   
 
The state of Oregon has faced the challenges (outlined by Nivola) to strong planning in the U.S., and achieved 
notable successes.  In 1973, Oregon introduced a groundbreaking growth management system that has been 
credited with a number of other achievements.  Since the early 1990s, the Portland regional government has 
been increasing its share of planning control and adopting stronger policies to guide development.  This 
strengthened planning approach is (at least faintly) reminiscent of Dutch planning. 
 
The number of commonalities appears to be increasing. Perhaps most importantly, the two systems are 
moving together in terms of the amount of government intervention and in their planning approaches.  The 
following schematic illustrates this idea:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government 
Controlled 
Development 
Free Market 
Development 
The 
Netherlands 
Oregon   7
Facing Common Challenges 
 
The two systems also hold in common some similar problems.  Both systems have been criticized for a 
supposed gap between what they write in plans and what really gets built on the ground, for placing 
limitations on consumer choice and private sector development and for limiting the freedom of local 
governments to act.  Oregon, and increasingly the Netherlands, must strike a balance between accommodating 
the private sector and pursuing other goals.  Patterns of urban deconcentration, growing automobile usage and 
deregulation are also common to both Europe and the U.S. (Beatley, 14).   
 
Opportunity for Mutual Learning 
 
Timothy Beatley is enthusiastic about the possibilities for the U.S. to learn from Europe, despite the great 
contextual differences.  He points to a rich history of European planning, environmental and sustainability 
ideas that have already been transplanted in the U.S. (including subscription farming, cohousing, enterprise 
zones, traffic calming measures and car-sharing) (Beatley, 13).  Planning ideas can and do make the passage 
across the Atlantic.  In a general sense, it is important to realize that alternative patterns do exist (Beatley, 
414).  These two cases, however, have more than just general lessons to exchange.  Several ideas from each 
system could be useful in addressing current weaknesses in the other system’s approach. 
 
Potential Lessons for Oregon… 
Oregon has been criticized for not achieving goals for development density and contiguity within their Urban 
Growth Boundaries and for raising housing costs.  Some Dutch planning tools (e.g., public land acquisition, 
development estates, housing policies) could help to meet those challenges.  Portland Metro might be moving 
into a position to try some of them out. 
 
Potential Lessons for the Netherlands… 
The Dutch are experimenting with liberalization of their planning system.  They can learn from Oregon’s 
track record in a relatively free market system.  Oregonian market-based techniques (e.g., incentive bonuses, 
flexible zoning and developer payments for project infrastructure) already exist in the Netherlands or are 
being discussed.  Looking to the results in Oregon could provide some lessons. 
 
Studying each other’s approach could be useful even if there are no opportunities to exchange tools. These 
two systems are moving closer together.  They can look to each other to see some of the opportunities and 
challenges that lay on the road ahead.    8
CHAPTER 1:  Spatial Planning in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will review the tool kit of spatial planning in the Netherlands, focussing on two things:  
First, the tools used by spatial planning agencies to control land development.  Second, the challenges 
and failings of the system and current systemic change trends. The aim of this chapter is to be 
descriptive and analytical.  First, it seeks to provide a thorough view of the tools used in the 
Netherlands to control or affect land development, for the purpose of adding to the practical 
knowledge of the system.  Second, it seeks to identify the challenges the planning system is facing, to 
explore how it is now responding and to theorize about how it will evolve in the future.  
 
This paper focuses on those issues related to the performance and operation of the system.  The Dutch 
spatial planning system is highly interventionist in nature, and has been flexible enough to embark in 
new policy directions while guarding a central core of ideals (Faludi, 23).  Criticisms have focussed on 
implementation—the gap between what is written in plans and what actually gets built.  Others claim 
that the Dutch system is too top down, restrictive of both market forces and local government policy 
entrepreneurship.  Under the Fourth National Report on Spatial Planning “Extra”, the Netherlands 
has begun a process of decentralization, liberalization and deregulation in the field of spatial planning.  
These trends appear likely to continue.  Some consequences for the operation of the system, the tools 
used and the distribution of planning authority will be discussed. 
 
Section I will review the governmental and societal context of planning and summarize some 
historical milestones.  Section II consists of a brief introduction to the evolution of the Dutch planning 
system.  Section III will describe the governmental bodies that impact on land development, the tools 
they employ and some criticisms of the system.  Section IV will provide a theoretical analysis of the 
issues discussed and explore directions the system may take in the future.    9
I.  Review of the Context for Spatial Planning in the Netherlands 
 
This section will provide background for a discussion of the spatial planning system by briefly 
introducing the unique spatial challenges that exist in the Netherlands, describing the Dutch political 
system, sketching the evolution of Dutch spatial planning and discussing environmental, housing and 
welfare systems. 
 
•  Background on Spatial Planning Issues 
 
The Netherlands is among the most densely populated nations in the world (Faludi, 26).  There are 
many conflicting demands placed on the land.  Household formation continues despite a low birth rate, 
adding to the need for more housing, especially in the densely populated West (ibid., 26).  Space for 
commercial and industrial sites is also in short supply in some areas.  Despite land use controls, cities 
and conurbations continue to grow closer together, while the areas designated as open buffer zones 
grow smaller (Drenthe Interviews).  In the interest of national goals, the government attempts to plan 
the physical environment and prevent unwanted development, with surprising success.  Only 13 
percent of Dutch land has been developed in an urban fashion (Beatley, 29).  Meanwhile, critics of the 
high level of planning intrusion into the market argue that people want more space and bigger houses 
and that businesses need room to grow.   
 
Contiguous development is a goal at all levels of the spatial planning system (Huis in’t Veld 
Interview).  However, this is becoming increasingly difficult in some municipalities as well-suited 
sites where growth is permitted are becoming scarce.
1  Nationwide, the Compact City policy has 
generally been successful in filling development into spaces in existing urbanized areas, meaning there 
is a shortage of sites left within cities (Faludi, 200). Great pressure is felt in places like Amsterdam and 
The Hague, which are caught between the sea and the protected Green Heart area.  Despite this context 
of high demand for development space, the Dutch have remained strongly committed to their spatial 
policies. 
 
                                                           
1 For example, Groningen has long worked toward the goal of a compact city (currently 50% of all internal 
movements are by bicycle) but now has few remaining infill sites. Groningen is hemmed in by protected 
natural areas to the north and by a town which is unfriendly to development to the south.  The city is thus 
forced to turn to less ideal locations for new development (e.g., a site which is separated from the center by an 
industrial estate). It may not be possible to continue to build in a contiguous manner unless something 
changes, meaning sacrificing protected areas or expanding into the neighboring town (Huis in’t Veld 
Interview).   10
 
 
Praise for the Dutch 
 
In the face of conflicting demands placed on the land, foreign observers praise the Dutch for their 
victories in shaping their built environment.  Many successful, adaptive reuse projects have been 
implemented in older areas of center cities, supporting the strength of those areas (Beatley, 39).  
Development of formerly open land has mostly been well connected with existing urban areas and well 
linked to public transit (ibid., 45).  Car use has been held down (35 percent of trips made in the nation 
under 2.5 kilometers are by foot, and 40 percent are by bicycle (ibid., 41).  While some criticize the 
Green Heart policies, Faludi and Van der Valk point out that without protection for open space in the 
Randstad, the West would probably be one large area of urban sprawl (Faludi, 5).  At the same time, 
questions exist about the stubborn nature of some problems, and the planning system’s methods in 
addressing them (about which more below).  For example, car use is projected to increase by 70 
percent between 1986 and 2010 if trends continue (Beatley, 62).  Meanwhile, pressures on the land 
continue to mount. 
 
•  The Dutch Planning Tradition 
 
There are a few unusual characteristics of the Dutch people and nation that seem to have pre-disposed 
them to cooperation in shaping their physical environment.  The Dutch have a long planning tradition, 
especially for water protection and management, which dates back to the 10
th century or earlier (Voogd 
2000, 2).  Since the Middle Ages, they have banded together for mutual defense and to fight against 
the water. A total of 27 percent of the country is below sea level and half of the land is subject to 
flooding, were there no dykes (Faludi, 26).  The fight against the water and the need to maintain 
reclaimed land has undoubtedly been a unifying force.  Water Boards and early public-private 
partnerships to prepare land have contributed to a strong emphasis on comprehensive planning and 
land as a public utility (ibid., 28).  Because of the high up front costs of development (a full 90 percent 
of land costs are for improvements including infrastructure and facilities) and the need for strong 
coordination, there is a long tradition of cities as developers (ibid., 29).  Government control has meant 
that land is an instrument for housing and planning.  Municipalities still provide 80 percent of the land 
that is developed, meaning that real estate speculation is uncommon.  This protects developers from 
financial risks, but also limits their choices.  
 
 
 
   11
Property Rights Issues 
 
In the Netherlands property rights disputes between government and land owners are not often settled 
in court (relative to many other countries) (Voogd 2000, 3).  This is largely because most areas, 
especially rural ones, are now planned (Drenthe Interviews).  Land use rules are already in place, and 
are backed up by provincial and national policies.  Therefore, landowners expect to be subject to 
restrictions, and landowners in areas designated by plans for acquisition are not caught by surprise by 
government buyouts.  When a property owner experiences damage resulting directly from a new or 
changed plan, they will receive compensation according to established procedures.  Thus, the 
“takings” issue, so hotly debated in the United States, is not a divisive one in the Netherlands. 
 
•  The Dutch Political System 
 
The Netherlands is a  “decentralized unitary state”, and is also described by Faludi and Van der Valk 
as a “consensus state”.  These terms imply that decisions are made through a process of  “co-
government”—the central government involves provinces and municipalities in policy-making and 
execution (Faludi, 33).  The government is organized into three tiers (the national, provincial and 
municipal governments).  Each tier is autonomous, but responsibilities are fluidly exchanged among 
them.  Ruling cabinets are always formed through a coalition-building process.  No single party has 
come close to a majority, so coalition building is necessary.  The Prime Minister is the chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, but is not a head of government and has few formal powers.  Separate national 
ministries are responsible for sectoral policy-making and for regulating the activities of provincial and 
municipal governments as they affect their sector (Faludi, 36).  The 25 Water Boards, exclusively 
concerned with water management, constitute another layer of government (Environmental Policy of 
the Netherlands, 6). 
 
This fragmented system creates the need for negotiation between ministries, political parties, 
provincial and municipal governments and other stakeholders in cases where goals do not coincide 
(Faludi, 36).  The Netherlands operates as a “representative democracy”, meaning that decisions are 
based on a combination of the views of representatives of interest groups and on expert knowledge 
(Voogd 2000, 3).  There is a well-developed system of institutional representatives and a general 
tendency to work for consensus.  Because of the expectation for repeated interactions, there is an 
emphasis on staying on speaking terms (again offering a contrast to countries where legal court cases 
often decide).  This tendency to work for consensus is an important feature in planning decision-
making, which is highly oriented toward negotiation. 
   12
 
Burgeoning Role of the European Union 
 
The European Union (EU) is playing an increasingly important role in policy-making for member 
states (Drenthe Interviews).  The EU is not very active in terms of spatial policy, but in terms of 
economic, agricultural and environmental policy, the EU increasingly constitutes a fourth, higher level 
of government for member nations.  Under the banner of sustainability, the EU is drafting fairly 
ambitious regulations that the member nations must follow (for example, EU environmental standards 
are now incorporated into the provincial license review process).   They are also active in terms of 
stimulating policy for regional and local governments to pursue sustainability goals (for example, the 
EU provides funding for part of the provincial Sustainable Drenthe project). 
 
•  Housing Policy, the Welfare State and Environmental Policy 
 
In the Netherlands “land, housing and the environment are public concerns” (Faludi, 26).  The Dutch 
government is responsible for guaranteeing the provision of basic needs to its citizens and for 
maintaining the Dutch environment.  Regulations control the cost of housing, affordable housing is 
built with government support, generous welfare payments provide support to the unemployed, and 
policies regulate differences in income and housing costs across regions of the country.  Compared to 
most other countries, there is a small income differential in the Netherlands (few citizens are really 
poor).  These policies are related closely to Dutch spatial planning policy as part of a society of 
government interventionism.  Also, by alleviating real hardships, they reduce the potential for equity 
issues that might otherwise attach themselves to spatial planning.  Finally, these sectors and the spatial 
planning sector are going through similar changes, including a tendency toward horizontal integration 
across sectoral lines (Housing in the Netherlands, 8). 
 
Though government intervention is still strong compared to other countries, since the 1980s, the 
Netherlands has been scaling down.  Economic challenges hit the Netherlands in the 1980s (Faludi, 
176).  Unemployment rose from an average of about 100,000 to about 300,000 in 1980; structural 
unemployment became a fact of life.  Costs rose, and the welfare system began to be seen as a liability.  
In response to this pressure, since the 1980s deregulation, decentralization, and privatization have been 
key concepts for the Dutch government. 
 
Housing 
 
Housing is closely tied to spatial planning in the Netherlands.  Since the Second World War, 
government subsidies for new homes have been a powerful tool for controlling the development   13
process (Faludi, 30).  At the peak of the housing policy in the 1980s, almost all housing was 
subsidized.  The government held the purse strings, and could direct housing into desired locations and 
patterns.  Post-war housing “location subsidies” (the government subsidized costly building sites) 
meant flat housing prices across the country.  Since the 1980s, housing policy has been drastically 
changed and subsidies are being phased out (Faludi, 31). In 1995, the funding from the central 
government to housing associations was cut, and housing associations are now independent from the 
government (Housing in the Netherlands, 34).   
 
Housing problems have changed from quantity to quality (Housing in the Netherlands, 6).  The market 
is now demanding bigger and better dwellings, and people are better able to organize to lobby for it.  
The trends are to reduce subsidies, encourage home ownership, construct more expensive free market 
housing and demolish unfashionable dwelling units (ibid., 23).  However, policies are still strong for 
disadvantaged groups, including rent allowances and a control on rent increases.  As of 1994, 43 
percent of housing was subsidized (Faludi, 176).  
 
The traditional tie between housing and spatial planning has been weakened, but still exists (e.g., 
housing locations are chosen to support urbanization and compact city policies) (Housing in the 
Netherlands, 8).  Rent subsidies continue to mean that potential unintended consequences of spatial 
policies are prevented (e.g., price inflation caused by institution of urban growth boundaries).  A major 
difference is that now the central government’s role has been reduced to creating the framework.  
Municipalities are increasingly expected to formulate their own housing policies, and to involve 
tenants in decision-making (ibid., 17, 19).     
 
The Environment 
 
The environment is a highly important political issue (Faludi, 32).  Dutch people place great value on 
the quality of their surroundings.  Concerns for wildlife enhancement and preservation are on the rise 
(e.g., some land which had been drained is now being returned to a natural state) (ibid., 29). Timothy 
Beatley credits the Netherlands with a leading role in supporting and experimenting with sustainable 
development (Beatley, 11).
2  EU support for sustainability is also a strong impetus (Beatley, 15).  
These environmental values are intimately connected with spatial planning, which defines the 
relationship between the built and natural environments (a view reflected by the trend to integrate 
planning for these sectors).   
 
                                                           
2 Sustainable development was defined by National Environmental Policy Plan as  “maintain(ing) the carrying 
capacity of the environment…” (NEPP, 3).   14
Over the last few decades, there has been a “considerable shift of powers from government to the 
provincial and municipal authorities”  (Environmental Planning in the Netherlands, 4).  The goal has 
been to make the distance between the administrative levels and the public as small as possible.  
Agenda 21, an action statement from the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, also 
emphasizes local government action and local sustainability plans as highly important in achieving 
environmental goals, asserting that many problems have their roots in local activities (Beatley, 4).  
Emphasis is being placed on coordination, creating joint standards between agencies and improving 
cooperation (NEPP, 3).  The central government now sets the framework, then provincial and local 
governments engage in an open planning process with public consultations.  The responsibility to meet 
targets is at the local level, and local bodies decide how to meet them (though they are still monitored 
by higher levels).   
 
•  Summary 
 
The Netherlands’ unique history, including water challenges and more recently, post-war 
reconstruction challenges, has fostered an emphasis on consensus and negotiation that is central to the 
Dutch political system.  These facts also fostered a high level of acceptance and support for an 
interventionist government.  After reassessment of the planning system in the 1980s, trends have been 
toward liberalization, decentralization, deregulation and integration of the housing, environmental and 
spatial planning sectors.  It is important to keep this background in mind when considering the spatial 
planning system, because all of these sectors are connected by their claims on space.  Also, though 
their spatial claims can conflict, these sectors should be viewed as forming a web of interconnected 
and (in a broad view) mutually supporting policies. 
 
 
II.  The Dutch spatial planning system 
 
This section will briefly summarize the history of modern planning in the Netherlands. 
 
•  Milestones in the Evolution of the Dutch Spatial Planning System 
 
Modern spatial planning traces its roots back to 1901 and the Housing Act (Woningwet) (NSPA, 4). 
The Act had a spatial component to it—the stipulation that allowed the designation of land for “streets, 
squares and canals”.  In 1921, that designation was replaced by more general land use designations.  
Then, in 1941 a special national planning agency was set up to assist the central government in 
spatially oriented decisions (the Government Agency for the National Plan (Rijksdienst voor het 
Nationale Plan)).  This agency created the first national plan, which became law along with regulations   15
for regional plans in 1950.  Faludi and Van der Valk characterize the period from 1920 to 1945 as the 
“unfolding of planning” (Faludi, xvii). 
 
In 1958 a rationale for national planning was formulated (Faludi, xvii).  This heralded what Faludi and 
Van der Valk term “the heyday” of spatial planning.  In 1962 parliament adopted the Spatial Planning 
Act (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening)—the act that now regulates planning, replacing the Housing Act 
for that purpose.  The Act came into law in 1965, along with the Spatial Planning Decree (Besluit op 
de Ruimtelijke Ordening), which added detail on various subjects (NSPA, 4).  Legislation establishing 
the powers of each of the three tiers of government was drawn up.  The Government Agency for the 
National Plan was renamed the National Spatial Planning Agency (NSPA) in the same year. 
 
The 1960s to the early 1980s were a period of unprecedented economic growth in the Netherlands 
(Faludi, xviii).  High optimism fostered extensions of the planning system and an increasingly 
comprehensive approach.  However, after the new system ushered in by the Spatial Planning Act and 
Decree had been in place for just over a decade, criticisms began to be voiced (NSPA, 4).  A bill was 
introduced in 1977, but parliament did not enact any changes until 1985, including a new text for the 
Spatial Planning Decree.  The changes were intended to shorten procedures and to increase the 
flexibility of various spatial planning instruments.  In the 1990s, more changes were introduced, 
particularly with respect to the powers of higher authorities to intervene in the policies of lower 
administrative levels.  These changes became law at the beginning of 1994.  Faludi and Van der Valk 
characterize the 1980s and early 1990s as a period of “crisis and response” for planning institutions as 
they adapt to the economic difficulties of the time (Faludi, xviii). 
 
Dutch strategic planning did not die out during the 1980s period of crisis, but in fact witnessed “a 
massive revival” (Mastop, 807).  In the mid-80s, while the Fourth National Report on Spatial 
Planning  was being prepared, new plans were drafted for nature conservation, transportation, and 
housing at the national and provincial levels, and many municipalities drafted strategic, integrated 
urban management plans (Mastop, 807).  Rather than signaling a dramatic split from prior planning 
practice, the changes introduced since the 1980s were related more to style than to the essential core 
values of the system (Faludi, 202).
3  Faludi and Van der Valk see Dutch planning ideas as having 
evolved from concentric development around towns and cities to the policy of controlled dispersal and 
back again to the compact city idea, always revolving around a solid core concept—the 
Randstad/Green Heart ideas (Faludi, 23). 
 
 
                                                           
3 This is in contrast to events in Britain, where the spatial planning system was largely dismantled.   16
•  The Fourth Report and “Extra” 
 
During the 1980s, the planning system was seen as largely ineffective in achieving its goals (Faludi, 
176).  In the Fourth Report, planners responded by trying to incorporate market forces into the system 
(Voogd 2000, 4).  This represented a move from “equity” based policies to “efficiency” based ones.  
The logic was that by improving the strong sectors of the country, the others would also benefit.  
Therefore, from the 1980s on, national planning policy has focussed on strengthening urban regions, 
especially in the Randstad (in contrast with the re-distributive Bundled De-concentration policy) (ibid., 
15).  
 
The Fourth Report on Physical Planning Extra (“Vierde Nota ruimtelijke ordening Extra”), or Vinex, 
represented a swing back from the liberal stance of the Fourth Report (Voogd 2000, 2). Vinex was 
formulated in 1990 and approved by parliament in 1993.  Its main goals were strengthening the 
economy and preservation of the environment.  It reinstated the importance of growth management 
and re-emphasized the Green Heart and Randstad concepts (ibid., 217).  However, reduction of 
government control over development was continued.   The policy of reducing subsidies for 
development and relying to a relatively large extent on the private sector to achieve planning goals 
appears to mean less government influence over development (ibid., 227).  As was the case for the 
housing and environmental sectors, the new emphasis was on privatization, decentralization, and 
deregulation (ibid., 176).   
 
It is within this framework that government tools for controlling land development are now operating.  
Thus, new approaches and tools are being implemented or discussed that fit with a more market-
oriented system. 
 
 
III.  TOOLS FOR CONTROLLING LAND USE DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, the specific tools used by each level will be discussed.  First, general categories of tools 
will be presented.  Then, national, provincial and municipal spatial planning tools will be discussed 
individually.  The relationships between the three tiers will also be reviewed.  This section will focus 
on the methods that directly impact on land development, their implementation and some problems 
they have encountered.  
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•  Structure of Governmental Authorities for Spatial Planning 
 
Most foreign observers of the Dutch spatial planning system assume that it is a highly ordered and 
centrally guided system, in which the national government, 12 provinces and 538 municipalities all 
work together in implementing the same legislation—the Act on Physical Planning (Voogd 2000, 3).  
The system is set up in a hierarchical fashion, with policy direction and oversight at the national level, 
translation of national goals and oversight of municipalities by the provinces, and implementation by 
the municipalities (see Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1:  Schematic of the Governmental Hierarchy (based on information from Frans Oste) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Voogd demonstrates, the system does not function as smoothly as that image would imply 
(discussed further below).  While the system seems highly centralized, the centrally controlling 
mechanisms are balanced by the fact that the national government depends on cooperation and 
information from the other actors (Faludi, 35).  The sectoral ministries have power through their 
funding programs, but they tend to create “institutional divisions crosscutting levels of government” 
(ibid., 37). 
 
Figure 2 provides a breakdown of the three executive levels of authority for spatial planning, and their 
advisory organizations (NSPA, 5).  The national level is represented by Parliament (De Staten-
Generaal) and the central government (de regering).  The provincial level is represented by the 
Provincial Council (Provinciale Staten) and the Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten).  The 
local level is represented by the Municipal Council (Gemeenteraad) and Municipal Executive (College 
van Burgemeester en Wethouders). 
 
The administrative decision-making bodies are supported by a number of official advisory bodies 
(NSPA, 5).  At the national level, these are the National Spatial Planning Commission 
(Rijksplanologische Commissie), the National Spatial Planning Agency (Rijksplanologische Dienst) 
and the Advisory Council for Spatial Planning (Raad voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening).  At the 
Provinces
Municipalities
National Government   18
provincial level, these are the Provincial Spatial Planning Commission (Provinciale Planologische 
Commissie) and the Provincial Spatial Planning Agency (Provinciale Planologische Dienst).  At the 
municipal level, there is the Municipal Spatial Planning Department (Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening). 
 
Figure 2: Executive and Advisory Agencies Responsible for Spatial Planning (NSPA, 5) 
Tier of Govt.  Executive  Advisory 
National Parliament 
Central Govt. 
Spatial Planning Commission 
Spatial Planning Agency (NSPA) 
Advisory Council for Spatial Planning 
Provincial Provincial  Council 
Provincial Executive 
Provincial Spatial Planning Commission 
Provincial Spatial Planning Agency 
Municipal Municipal  Council 
Municipal Executive 
Municipal Spatial Planning Department 
 
 
•  Two Categories of Policy Tools 
 
The Spatial Planning Act provides the decision-making bodies with a large number of spatial planning 
instruments.  NSPA distinguishes two rough categories of tools used by the three tiers of government:   
Category One:  “Vision” plans and policy documents allow the administrative bodies at each level to 
carry out spatial planning in a form that is both tangible and open to discussion.   These plans describe 
the goals and policy directions selected by the political process.  
Category Two:  “Directive Policies” are laid down, then handed to the levels below for 
implementation.  These are policies intended for more direct compliance by the actors under their 
authority.   
 
Figure 3:  Tools Employed at each Tier of Government (NSPA, 3) 
  1:  Vision Documents  2:  Directive Policy Documents  
National  National Spatial Planning 
Report (Nota), 
Spatial Planning Policy 
Document 
Directives 
Exemption Provisions 
 
Provincial  Regional Spatial Plan  Directives 
Approval of Local Land Use Plans 
Municipal Structure  Plan 
Local Land Use Plan 
Building and Construction Permits 
Exemptions 
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•  National Level Spatial Planning  
 
The national government creates the overall vision for how the country should grow (NSPA, 10).  The 
main instruments for this purpose are the national policy documents on spatial planning, which contain 
the main points of spatial planning for the medium and long term, and the sectoral policy structure 
plans, which are policy guidelines for particular sectors.  Implementation is left to the provinces and 
municipalities, with the national government responsible for monitoring their progress in achieving 
national goals.  To provide guidance to the other tiers of government, the national government uses the 
method of consultation or amendments to general administrative orders.  Under Vinex, there is no 
formal requirement for provinces and municipalities to follow national policies, but funding from 
national and European subsidies gives it strong pull (Voogd 2000, 3).  
 
National Spatial Planning Bodies 
 
Generally, the initiative for policies comes from government, for consideration by parliament (NSPA, 
7).  Parliament is also responsible for monitoring government policy, and government agencies are 
required to submit documents explaining spatial policy actions.  The Council of Ministers coordinates 
national policy on spatial planning.  The Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
has authority over the National Spatial Planning Agency, which assists in policy formulation, research, 
advising and monitoring.  The Advisory Council for Spatial Planning coordinates and stimulates 
consultation between government and society at large on spatial planning issues (ibid., 9).  The 
National Spatial Planning Commission attends to interministerial preparation of spatial planning 
policy.  Finally, there are four spatial planning Inspectors, who oversee the provinces.  
 
The National Reports on Spatial Planning 
 
The National Reports (Nota) are vision plans intended to set the tone of development for the entire 
country (Voogd 2000, 3).  The reports do not designate exact parameters for policy implementation, 
but encourage provincial and local governments to translate them into concrete, down-to-earth policy.  
Ideally, the goals of the national plan will be integrated into approvals of individual projects by 
municipalities and to plan review by the provinces.  The Fourth Report Extra (Vinex) is now in effect.  
In this section, some aspects of the Vinex will be discussed. 
 
Vinex Locations   
The main change instituted by Vinex was an emphasis on the concentration of new development at 
large locations within and adjacent to the city—Vinex locations (Voogd 2000, 5).  This is an attempt to   20
strengthen population growth in urban areas and to stabilize or decrease it in areas intended to be 
preserved from development (e.g., the Green Heart).  Vinex allocates less funding for supporting 
development than previous legislation (70 percent of dwelling units are to be built by the private sector 
without government support).   
 
In practice, Vinex locations encountered implementation problems (Voogd 2000, 17).  The Vinex 
requirement of situating new development in the urban fringe frequently means dealing with difficult 
sites, due to the presence of factors that had been seen as barriers to development in the past (e.g., 
brownfields and transportation corridors).  In addition, several problems arose because developers 
were able to purchase land before the municipalities were able to do so (see Active Land policies, 
below).  This meant the municipalities could not earn the profits they typically do from buying land for 
“farmland prices”, but instead had to buy it for “construction prices”.  As a result of this, the 
municipalities had to negotiate with the developers on who would pay for infrastructure.  For the same 
reason, low income housing targets became very difficult to realize, forcing the national government to 
reduce its requirements for that type of housing. 
 
ABC Location Policy   
This policy was introduced to improve the integration of land use policy with transportation planning, 
in order to reduce car mobility (Voogd 2000, 18).  It created a hierarchy of locations based on 
accessibility:  A-locations are easily accessible to local, regional and national public transport.  Car 
commuting should be under 10-20 percent.  B-locations are easily accessible both by local and 
regional public transport and car.  Car commuting should be under 35 percent.  C-locations are easily 
accessible by car.  The system then assigned firms a “mobility factor” based on their car and freight 
needs.  Firms with many “counter” employees should locate in A-locations but never C-locations.  
Other offices should locate in A or B-locations, and C-locations are appropriate only for transport 
activities or land intensive functions.  The system includes standards such as density of employees per 
square meter and parking places per employee (e.g., in A-locations, 10 spaces per 100 employees are 
allowed).  The national government negotiates with municipalities (with funding as the carrot) to 
persuade them to follow the policy. 
 
The ABC Location policy achieved mixed results (Voogd 2000, 18).  There is evidence of some 
compliance, including fewer offices locating along highways and many sites developed near train 
stations.  Location choices did show a shift in the desired direction from 1991-1996.  However, 30 
percent of new establishments still got permits to build in undesired locations for their type of 
business.  Almost 36 percent located in the “right place”, but four out of five of those ended up with 
more parking places than directed by the policy.  This was because municipalities accepted payment   21
from the developers for each additional space.  In fact, the ABC Location policy created a perverse 
incentive for municipalities to encourage this behavior.   
 
Summary 
 
Vinex policies have apparently failed to achieve two of the most important substantive goals.  They did 
not stop growth in any of the protected areas (some growth restricted areas saw 25 percent growth 
between 1990 and 1998), though Vinex probably did slow suburbanization (Voogd 2000, 17).  This 
was despite strong efforts to prevent growth, including a firm growth boundary drawn around the 
Green Heart.  Nor did Vinex meet the goal of reducing car mobility.  Both of these failures may have 
been a result of external factors, and it could be argued that the situation would have been worse 
without Vinex.
4  
 
The Fourth Report and Vinex were influenced by the perception of a failure of earlier planning efforts 
to be effective.  Nonetheless, if judged solely on the basis of substantive accomplishments, Vinex did 
little better.  These are discouraging results if one judges a plan based solely on substantive results.  In 
Section IV, an alternative method for evaluating plan success will be discussed. 
 
•  Provincial Level Spatial Planning 
 
The provinces, as the intermediary level, are expected to provide a connection between national goals 
and local implementation (Drenthe Interviews).  They fulfill three primary functions—coordinating 
between the other two tiers, creating a regional comprehensive vision for growth and providing 
oversight for local action.  Faludi and Van der Valk state that as the intermediaries between national 
government and the municipalities, provinces have become increasingly prominent in planning, 
acquiring executive tasks delegated from the national government (Faludi, 34). 
 
Provincial Level Spatial Planning Bodies 
The Provincial Council is responsible for directing future spatial planning policy in its province 
(NSPA, 13).  The Provincial Executive prepares and implements provincial policy.  Each province has 
a Provincial Spatial Planning Commission that advises provincial government on implementation.  
The Provincial Spatial Planning Agency, and sometimes also a separate office for spatial planning, 
provide monitoring, research, advising and assistance in policy formulation. 
                                                           
4The increasing number of two earner households (both of whom drive) are more likely to seek 
locations between two jobs.  Voogd argues that this trend means that the basic assumption that locating 
development adjacent to cities will capture commutes within that urban region is wrong (Voogd 2000, 
17).   22
Provincial Level Spatial Planning Instruments 
 
The Provincial Plan   
Provincial structure plans (streekplan) are intended to be comprehensive plans giving overall guidance 
to development in their areas (Faludi, 152).  The provincial plan outlines the main aspects of future 
spatial development in rural areas of the province.  The plan does not cover urban areas, except for 
designating growth centers and growth limited municipalities (NSPA, 14).  The drafting of provincial 
plans involves consultation with neighbors and review by the national government, which can require 
changes.  Provincial plans are indicative and strategic, rather than binding (Faludi, 13), but they do 
have some binding force (NSPA, 14).  Decisions that have been characterized as “essential” cannot be 
departed from by the Provincial Executive without first revising the regional plan.  The strength of 
provincial policies depends on the political context of the province and the power of the lobbies 
interested in exceptions (Drenthe Interviews).
5   
 
Provinces are required to plan for water, spatial development and the environment (Drenthe 
Interviews).  Most also engage in planning for other sectors, such as traffic, housing and the economy.  
Several provinces have now begun the process of horizontal integration of sectoral aspects into a 
single plan (e.g., the Province of Drenthe).  Integrated plans are more holistic, but also more general 
than the sectoral plans were. 
 
The provinces’ main source of influence over local land use decisions comes from their responsibility 
to review local land use plan changes (Drenthe Interviews).  This occurs because any development 
project proposed must fit with the local function plan, or else the plan has to be changed.  At that point, 
the province has the responsibility to review the proposed change to decide if it accords with 
provincial goals.  The provincial plan provides the Provincial Executive with the policy basis for 
approving or rejecting local land use plans (NSPA, 14).  Provincial plan review is conceptual in 
character—it is based not on review of a yes/no list, but on an assessment of whether the proposed 
change fits into the policy concepts of the provincial plan.  Negotiation plays a major role in the 
process.  
 
The provincial plan incorporates tools including (among others) growth boundaries, growth timing 
requirements, zoning and environmental standards and other performance standards, all of which are  
used as criteria in local land use plan change reviews (Drenthe Interviews).  Most infrastructure is 
provided by municipalities and some by the central government (e.g., main highways), and most 
                                                           
5 For example, in Drenthe two notable exceptions were made to provincial policy in the case of a Gas Unie 
site in an area designated as highly protected, and a space monitoring station in a designated quiet area.   23
funding comes from the national government.  Therefore, infrastructure and funding are not strong 
guiding tools in the provincial arsenal. 
 
According to Drenthe provincial planners, zoning for the non-urbanized areas of the province is the 
main tool incorporated within the plan (Drenthe Interviews).  The zones are a hierarchy of levels of 
restriction of development (in Drenthe, they range from the most permissive zone  which permits just 
agricultural activities to the most restrictive zone covering wooded areas, where no building is 
allowed).  No new development is allowed in rural areas unless the province first approves a change to 
the local land use plan concerned.
6  Provincial plans indicate where not to grow in strong terms, 
including areas to be added to protected zones (should land owners in those areas wish to sell, they are 
required to offer the land first to environmental organizations). 
 
To Voogd, the most important function of provincial plans is assigning urban growth boundaries 
(UGBs) which restrict urban land development to the area inside the boundary (Voogd 2000, 5).  
Because provincial plans are broadly focussed, often the exact location of the UGB is negotiated with 
the municipality.  The boundaries are generally used to reinforce restrictions already in place in the 
provincial plan for areas that are adjacent to urbanized areas (Drenthe Interviews).  They are then 
interpreted as a strengthened argument against approving local land use changes that would violate 
their intent. 
 
Additional Powers of the Province 
 
The provinces are also vested with authority to grant or deny licenses for larger developments or those 
with regional impact (Drenthe Interviews).  Also, some provincial rules are directly binding on 
citizens.  These include restrictions on disruptive activities in sensitive areas, such as those designated 
as quiet areas, soil/landscape protection areas and water collection areas (e.g., no loud motors 
permitted in quiet zones). 
 
Influence of the National Plan on the Province 
 
The influence of national planning is present in the provincial plan, largely due to conditional funding 
streams (Voogd 2000, 5).  Provinces are strongly motivated to at least “pay lip service” to national 
goals. One important example is the provincial power to designate growth centers and growth 
restricted municipalities, based on quotas handed down to the province from the national government.  
                                                           
6 There is one exception to this restriction on development in rural areas.  It is now permitted in the least 
restrictive zone of the Drenthe Plan for people to build large, luxurious residences, so long as they are on large   24
However, there is some mismatch of national policies with the situation in more peripheral provinces 
(those located further from the Randstad) (Drenthe Interviews).  The Netherlands tends to divide into 
four areas—the North, South, East and West.  Because of the differences between these regions, 
planning needs differ as well.  For example, ABC Location policies limiting the number of allowed 
parking spaces are more difficult to implement in lower density areas that do not have well-developed 
public transport systems.  Though national policies tend to be less strict for rural areas, national quotas 
are adopted into provincial rules.  
 
Criticisms of Provincial Planning 
 
Provincial structure plans are intended to be comprehensive plans giving overall guidance to 
development in their areas, as well as vehicles for coordinating physical development and rendering 
national ideas operational (Faludi, 152).  Faludi and Van der Valk argue that this was an overly 
ambitious goal.  The provinces have too few instruments to bridge the gap between “national theories 
and local arguments”.  Evidence of this lack of tools can be found, in the form of unplanned 
developments the provinces could not prevent (Drenthe Interviews).  Some provincial planners argue 
that the provinces are the weakest tier of government (the national level has the lion’s share of the 
money and the locals have the direct control) (Drenthe Interviews).  In the case of larger cities, a direct 
link between municipal government and the national government can tend to cut provinces out of the 
process.   
 
Due to lack of sufficient funds, provinces rarely pursue active land acquisition (Drenthe Interviews).  
Therefore, most initiative for development comes from the bottom up (from municipalities and the 
private sector), with the province getting involved only at the local land use plan review stage.  One 
Drenthe planner argues that this constitutes a void of much-needed initiative at the provincial level.  
Local vision plans are uncommon and local land use plans often lack a strategic vision, are out of date 
and cover only a small area.  This can mean that there is a weak connection between the provincial 
plan and implementation.  
 
Provinces are working to address these challenges in creative ways.  Some provinces are trying to 
adopt a more proactive role, getting involved before the plan review stage (Drenthe Interviews).
7  A 
shift from an emphasis on blueprint planning toward planning that incorporates more flexibility is also 
prevalent.  Other changes would give provinces more power.  For instance, provinces now have the 
authority to intervene in the local planning process (NSPA, 19).  One proposal would give provinces 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
parcels of land which remain mostly open space.  This innovative policy is intended to accommodate one high 
end portion of residential market demand (Drenthe Interviews).   25
more power to implement regional scale projects.  Currently, any proposed project would have to be 
approved by each municipality in which it will be built.  The proposal would increase provincial power 
by allowing the province to make binding plans for regional projects that would not need to seek 
municipal approval. 
 
Summary 
 
The role of the provinces has been much discussed, largely due to concern with a “regional gap”, a 
lack of power positioned to impact on supra-local and regional problems (Faludi, 152).  Over the 
years, proposals for addressing these shortcomings have included adding another layer of government 
between the provinces and the municipalities focussed on metropolitan areas, or cutting provinces 
back to the size of city-regions.  Within the existing system, efforts are being made to make the 
provinces more proactive and flexible, or to increase their planning authority.   
 
•  Local Level Spatial Planning 
 
Municipalities are responsible for direct oversight of local land development (Drenthe Interviews).  
Municipalities approve or reject all proposed developments and stipulate the specifics of development 
including methods, building location, character, physical features and more.  Municipalities also 
provide almost all infrastructure.  However, they are required to fulfill national policy (Faludi, 35).  
The central government is also the source of about 90 percent of municipal income (though this is 
changing—grants for housing and planning are still high, but are now diminishing).  Also, local land 
use plan changes are required to incorporate criteria from the provincial plan (Drenthe Interviews).  
Thus, the municipalities have strict parameters within which they must operate.  
 
Local Level Spatial Planning Bodies 
 
Like their provincial counterparts, the Municipal Council is the elected body that determines local 
spatial planning policy by drawing up plans and adopting policy documents (NSPA, 17).  The 
Municipal Executive is responsible for implementing those plans.  There is no formal consultative 
body or required consultations for plan preparation, but most have a committee on spatial planning.   
The Municipal Spatial Planning Department provides staff functions such as assisting in spatial 
planning, monitoring, conducting research and advising the Council.  Many municipalities use private 
consultants for this function.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
7 An example of this is the Sustainable Drenthe project.  The province is conducting an outreach campaign to 
assist municipalities in implementing provincial sustainability goals.   26
Local Level Spatial Planning Instruments 
There are two types of land use plans at the local level—structure plans (structuurplan) and local land 
use plans (bestemmingsplan) (NSPA, 18).  Augmenting those plans, municipal Capital Improvement 
Programs are important in controlling development timing by tying approvals to the availability of 
infrastructure, traffic generation and other issues.  
 
Structure Plans   
Structure plans designate in broad outline the future development of the municipality or a part of it 
(NSPA, 18).  Though different in scale, they are very similar in concept to the regional spatial plan.  
They outline the chosen path for future development, are descriptive and general in nature, and are 
used as a guideline for municipal policy decisions.  Structure plans include a description of the main 
goals, policies and phases of development, explanatory maps and a justification of policy section.  
Neighboring municipalities may combine for this.  They are not compulsory.  Currently, their number 
is fairly small, but it is gradually increasing.  Some municipalities also draft area or neighborhood 
plans and/or plans for specific functions or systems (Huis in’t Veld Interview). 
 
Two trends are discernible in recent structure plan changes (Huis in’t Veld Interview).  First, as is the 
case at the provincial level, there is a trend to integrate municipal structure plans horizontally (e.g., 
Groningen).  Second, in the past these plans were viewed as being blueprint documents, showing 
exactly where and how development would occur.  Now, more emphasis is being placed on flexibility 
and working with market forces.  These two trends are in response to forces affecting the Dutch 
planning system in general, and correspond with changes occurring at the provincial and national 
levels. 
 
Local Land Use Plans   
The local land use plan is the only plan that is binding on citizen and government bodies, making it far 
more consequential than structure plans (NSPA, 18).  According to NSPA, “almost every spatial 
planning decision at the municipal level is linked to the local land use plan in one way or another”.  
The Municipal Council is obligated to draw them up for all rural areas, though they are not required 
for built-up areas.  They are legally binding, and are the legal basis of, and primary land use planning 
test for, issuing building permits and construction permits (which regulate certain construction works).  
They are also the basis for obliging private developers to contribute to the cost of public services, for 
claiming compensation for loss of value and for compulsory purchase of property.  The Spatial 
Planning Act requires that they be reviewed once every 10 years. 
 
Drafting local land use plans must follow stringent procedures (NSPA, 19).  They must include an 
explanation of the rationale behind their decisions (based on a structure plan if there is one) (Huis in’t   27
Veld Interview).  Only after the plan has been drawn up and adopted by the Municipal Council can 
higher authorities influence it (e.g., the Provincial Executive can withhold approval).  However, since 
1994 higher authorities can oblige a municipality to amend its plan to comply with national or 
provincial policy.  For projects of national or regional importance, the Provincial Executive or 
Minister may intervene directly in municipal plan-making or oblige the municipality to grant an 
exemption to the local land use plan.  However, this step is rarely used and is seen as a punishment 
(Drenthe Interviews).  Monitoring and enforcement is done mostly by the municipalities, with the 
central government rarely stepping in.  Should developers fail to meet agreements or requirements, the 
municipalities must monitor, enforce and take them to court if necessary (Heins Interview). 
 
A municipality must approve a building permit if it matches the local land use plan, even if it does not 
agree with provincial and national plans (Voogd argues that this weakens national policies) (Voogd 
2000, 5).  Building permits (bouwvergunning) are the main permit for directly controlling land use 
changes (NSPA, 22).  If a proposal is made for an area not covered by a local land use plan, granting a 
building permit is based just on safety, health, and utility of the proposed project.  If the area is 
covered by a land use plan, then the proposal must meet the plan’s provisions.  Local land use plans 
can be detailed or general, and content is determined by the municipality (NSPA, 19).
8   
 
Active Land Policies:  The well-known order and planned character of most Dutch communities has a 
lot to do with  municipal powers.  In particular, active land policies give municipalities powerful tools 
(NSPA, 23).  Dutch municipalities generally acquire and service the land necessary for a development, 
then offer it to developers for purchase (historically, this approach was useful because government was 
needed to coordinate draining water off of new land).  This means that local government has a great 
deal of control over the location and character of new developments.  Active land policies include 
three measures employed by the municipality: 
 
  1.  Land development and provision of local infrastructure:  Because municipalities acquire 
land, prepare it for development and provide the necessary infrastructure, they have much more control 
than if they were just issuing or withholding permits (NSPA, 23).  The municipality can decide where 
and how to build infrastructure, which land to set aside and how to divide the land into plots.  They 
can choose a developer to sell or lease to.  Municipalities can also attach conditions that are more 
detailed than those allowed under building permits or planning law (e.g., they can specify if the land 
should be for rent or for sale, when construction must start, or a wide variety of other conditions).  For 
developers, benefits include protection from the up front costs of land preparation and infrastructure. 
                                                           
8 Criteria for local land use plans often include fitting into the proper function for the zone, design criteria 
(architectural style, height, position), number of parking spaces, traffic generation, environmental rules and 
rules regarding the relationship between the city and rural areas (Huis in’t Veld Interview).   28
 
Because municipalities are largely in control of land provision, they can also maximize efficiency by 
preparing large parcels of land at one time or in planned stages, coordinating infrastructure provision, 
then directing a large amount of development to that location (Drenthe Interviews).  These parcels are 
then referred to as estates.  In smaller municipalities, there is often only one housing estate at a time, 
filling gradually with new developments.  Meanwhile, development can also take place through infill 
or redevelopment within the urban area. 
 
The estate system places much project control in the hands of municipalities, but this comes at the 
expense of developer choice of location (Heins Interview).  Municipalities are now attempting to 
provide more location choices to developers by preparing multiple areas for development (Huis in’t 
Veld Interview).  Also, the National Spatial Planning Agency expects that, partly in response to this 
criticism, more and more land will in the future be serviced by the private sector (NSPA, 23).  
Already, an increasing number of municipalities are allowing developers to provide the infrastructure, 
especially in Vinex locations (Heins Interview).  
 
  2.  Compulsory purchase:  This tool is used to prevent land owners from refusing to sell land 
to the municipality (NSPA, 23).  Its use is regulated by the Compulsory Purchase Act 
(Onteigeningswet), which grants municipalities a wide range of justifications for making compulsory 
purchases.  Compulsory purchase can be made in order to implement a local land use plan or to 
maintain an existing situation which is in a plan; for implementing a construction plan; for clearing 
sites to be used for housing; or, for clearing dwellings that have been vacated or are unfit for 
habitation.  However, they are rarely used in practice.  Municipalities avoid using this heavy-handed 
tool by offering the price that owners would receive for compulsory purchase at the beginning of the 
negotiation process (usually twice the existing use value).   
 
3.  Recouping servicing and infrastructure costs:  This tool can be used by municipalities to 
recover the cost of servicing the land (NSPA, 23).  Costs can be partly recouped by amicable 
agreement in two ways—through the selling price (the general approach), or through an ordinance of 
the Spatial Planning Act.  The municipality can also apply to recoup some losses compulsorily, but 
this law is rarely used because it is very cumbersome.   
 
Preemption Rights   
Preemption rights give a large advantage to municipal governments by preventing real estate 
speculation (NSPA, 23).  If a municipality has indicated in its plan that it has an intention to develop or 
protect a parcel of land, then the property owner must offer that land to the municipality before   29
offering it for sale on the market.  Thus, the right of preemption means that municipalities can secure 
land before real estate speculators can acquire it and raise the price.
9  
 
Municipalities and Developers 
 
The approach that municipalities adopt depends on many factors, but in particular the strength of the 
market is a determining factor (Heins Interview).  Local land use plans in areas with strong land 
markets are highly detailed and include many requirements, while plans in municipalities with less 
demand tend to be more flexible.  For example, Leeuwarden has trouble attracting development, so it 
has more flexible local land use plans than Groningen.  In turn, Utrecht, where the market is even 
stronger, has even more regulations for projects.  Municipalities generally employ a combination of 
active land use policies and regulatory tools; incentive approaches (e.g., density increases are 
exchanged for developer provision of public amenities) are rarely used in the Netherlands.  Public-
private partnerships are an approach that is emphasized at this time, due to the reductions in 
government subsidies.  
 
National influence over local decisions 
 
The character of development for many sites is the end result of negotiations between the national and 
local governments (municipalities tend to try to get permission to build in protected areas, while the 
national government argues for more compact building) (Heins Interview).  Municipalities choose the 
type and the locations for housing, except for Vinex locations.  As discussed above, decentralization of 
control over land development is increasing the amount of control concentrated at the local level, 
though central control is still strong (Huis in’t Veld Interview).  Some observe that there can be a 
mismatch between national goals and local needs.  For example, municipalities required to adhere to 
Vinex location policies may not be able to plan creatively based on local knowledge.
10  As provincial 
planners have observed on the regional level, there can be a mismatch between national policies and 
local needs.  
 
                                                           
9 There is one exception—when the landowner can realize a development themselves, they are not required to 
offer it to the municipality (Huis in’t Veld Interview).  This loophole has been a weakness for municipal 
planning, since a landowner can claim to be developing themselves, but with a developer in the background. 
10 Huis in’t Veld argues that because of national controls, Groningen cannot bring some of its best locations to 
market, with the unintended consequence of forcing firms to locate further away from the center.  Similarly, 
the ABC Location policy can discourage businesses from investing in the center city, where restrictions are 
the strictest.   30
 
 
Strong Municipal Tools, but Do They Work? 
 
While municipalities complain that there is too much national control, provincial and national planners 
are concerned that locals seem to often fail to successfully direct development into desired patterns.  
Critics point to the local land use plan.  Local land use plans were introduced in the 1965 Spatial 
Planning Act and Decree on Spatial Planning (Damme, 833).  Since the 1970s they have been 
criticized for poor performance.  The idea was that there should be a direct link between land use plans 
and issuing permits for building and construction permits.  However, plan departures are common, 
leading to “blatant discrepancies between policies and implementation”, and Faludi and Van der Valk 
add, “a well-established alternative via massively granted exceptions” (Faludi, 234).   
 
One problem is the level of detail incorporated into plans.  Beatley argues that greater detail means 
greater certainty for developers (Beatley, 58).  While this is probably true, problems arise because the 
high level of “unnecessary” detail in most plans makes exact compliance difficult (Faludi, 234).  
Voogd argues that the explanation for the implementation problem relates to the requirement that 
municipalities use local plans in a highly regulatory way (Voogd 2000, 21).  When proposed projects 
fit within the plan, municipalities must grant them building permits.  When they do not, the authorities 
must deny approval.  This might work if the plans were perfect reflections of current conditions and 
goals.  However, while plans are required to be updated every ten years, that requirement is not 
enforced.  Municipalities are often reluctant to shoulder the expenses of updating plans, and old plans 
remain in force until updated.  Often, too few people look after the local land use plans, and not all 
local councils are concerned that the plan be followed (Drenthe Interviews).  Thus, local land use plans 
are often only loosely connected with policy visions as expressed in the provincial and national plans. 
 
An alternative to strict plan compliance exists in preliminary decree procedures (intended to 
incorporate some flexibility into the local land use plan) (NSPA, 20).  One such is the “Article 19 
procedure”, which allows a municipality to grant an exemption if a preliminary decree is in force or a 
draft plan has been put on display, making it possible to give approval of a proposed project in 
anticipation of a new plan.  This creates a big temptation for municipalities to approve projects that do 
not comply with the plan, then claim they were going to change the plan anyway.  Combined with the 
difficulty of maintaining high quality, updated and highly detailed plans, the Article 19 procedure 
further contributes to “plan erosion”, and to the “misuse and even nonuse” of local land use plans 
(Damme, 835).  Thus, Damme et al claim that plans largely fail to guide development.  Municipalities 
can prevent undesirable development by strict plan requirements, then quickly approve desired ones 
(from 1971-1977, 20 percent of all building permits issued were based on Article 19).     31
 
The 1985 revisions were largely targeted at improving plan performance, opting for a solution that 
gave municipalities more flexibility in local land use implementation (Damme, 834).  The revisions 
did not change the basic principles.  Municipalities were still responsible for planning and the local 
land use plan was still the only legally binding document (ibid., 836).  However, emphasis shifted 
from quantitative rules to more qualitative ones.  While the revision tightened Article 19 requirements, 
it also introduced new flexible procedures to bypass the plan and give exemptions.
11  The revisions 
also sped up plan-making procedures and made the applicable rules more flexible.  Finally, revisions 
created the possibility of using two new types of plans.  One is the “description in outline”, a plan that 
directly incorporates the underlying principles and goals into the plan, allowing interpretation to be 
based directly on those principles; the second new option was to write a general plan with few details.  
These two types of plans step away from the high level of detail incorporated in plans prior to 1985. 
 
The next question should be whether the 1985 revisions were successful in addressing the gap between 
policy and implementation.  Damme et al find no clear indications of improved performance (Damme, 
839).  Between July 1986 and May 1993, about 15 percent of municipalities making new plans 
adopted either of the new approaches.  However, there was no reduction in use of Article 19.  Damme 
et al argue that this is because the problem rests more with the planning process than with the types of 
plans used.  There should be more emphasis on ongoing communication between the actors involved 
and the public, more “successive commitment, policy coproduction, and contingency planning” (ibid., 
840).  
 
Summary 
 
The municipalities do indeed possess remarkably strong tools to control new development.  However, 
implementation apparently fails to meet expectations.  For the reasons discussed, there is a gap 
between local land use plans (the implementing legislation) and provincial and national goals.  In 
Section IV, the question of the “implementation gap” will be addressed. 
 
 
IV. Theoretical  Discussion   
 
In this section, the performance of the Dutch spatial planning system will be placed within a theoretical 
framework.  Then the implications of current change trends on the practice of planning in the future will be 
discussed. 
                                                           
11 This seeming contradiction is indicative of the difficulty of solving the conflict between plan certainty and 
flexibility.   32
 
•  Interdependent Actors, Not Hierarchical Control 
 
Figure 4 (on Page 33) offers a schematic representation of the relationships between the three tiers.  In 
contrast to a hierarchical, top down governmental structure (as illustrated in Figure 1), the Dutch 
spatial planning system can be described as an interlinked web of relationships (see Figure 4).  Though 
in theory, the national government can exercise a high degree of direct control, since the Fourth 
Report this power has diminished.   
 
Each tier of government has a special role to play that gives it power in the process of decision-
making.  National government exercises a great deal of power through defining the national vision and 
distributing funds.  National goals find their way into municipal plans both through the vehicle of 
provincial plans and through the power of direct funding and directives applied to municipalities.  
Provinces have an important role in defining the regional vision and pass that on to municipalities 
through plan reviews (though they may not have all the tools needed for this function).  Municipalities 
are closest to the object (the built environment).  Their role as interpreters of planning goals and as 
implementers and enforcers of planning policies gives them great power.  Also, the other tiers rely on 
them for firsthand information.  Finally, the role of other actors (including the public and developers) 
is increasingly important.  Vinex views the private sector as partners in the planning process, who can 
participate in plan-making and provide essential financing.  
 
The arrangement emphasizes negotiation and consensus-building as keys to success (about which 
more below). 
 
•  Performance of the Dutch Spatial Planning System 
 
The Implementation Gap 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Dutch system was criticized for being “cumbersome, out of date, 
inefficient, and ineffective” (Mastop, 807).  Key to these criticisms was the perception that there was 
an “implementation gap” between what was written in plans and what is actually implemented (ibid., 
809).  As discussed in Section III, this problem has not gone away under Vinex.  Voogd observes that 
under Vinex there have been “severe difficulties with restrictive growth policies” (Voogd 2000, 2).  
Areas that should have been restricted from growth have nonetheless shown average annual growth 
rates as high as 3 percent or more in recent years.   Built 
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Much critical attention is being paid to the failure to translate policies from the provincial level into 
implementation by the municipal level (see Figure 4).  The provincial responsibility to translate 
national policies into a regional context, and to enforce their implementation, is certainly daunting.  
However, it can be argued that a gap also exists between the national and provincial levels, and 
between the municipal government and developers.  Each time planning goals are passed to another 
level represents a potential gap in implementation.  
 
•  Conclusion:  Implications for the Practice of Spatial Planning 
 
This chapter has reviewed the land development tools used by each level of government and the 
criticism and theories from the literature regarding their performance.  The final step is to attempt to 
summarize the changes occurring in the practice of spatial planning as they relate to land development 
practices.   
 
Decision-making authority is in flux in the Netherlands.  Figure 5 (below) shows the changing 
concentrations of power for spatial planning.  The following paragraphs will discuss those changes. 
 
The current trend in the spatial planning sector is toward decentralization, deregulation and 
liberalization (see Section II).  The central government is adopting an increasingly hands off role.  The 
government creates the framework, then allows the regional and local governments to implement it.  
This role is still quite important, but is nonetheless a less dominant one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Functional Area 
Decision-making Authority for Land Development 
Least Emphasis                              Most Emphasis 
National 
Provincial 
Municipal 
?
Private Sector 
FIGURE 5: 
?   35
 
Figure 5 is an approximation of current, ongoing shifts in land development authority.  The circles 
represent an estimate of the relative amount of authority to take the initiative in decision-making as it 
is currently distributed among these five levels.  The arrows show the direction in which that amount 
of authority is moving relative to the other levels.  In summary, the national level is still important, but 
emphasis is now being placed more on the municipal level and the private sector to take the initiative.  
It is unclear what the provinces may do next.  The figure is not meant to suggest that there is a 
governmental body at the Functional Area level, but that it is becoming more important for planners to 
think in terms of the functional area. 
 
The provincial tier is under re-assessment.  As the intermediate level of government, the provinces 
exchange authority and power with both the national and municipal levels.  Trends are currently not 
clear.  Adding to a long dialogue on the provincial role, there have been recent discussions of ideas for 
metropolitan governance based on the urban areas of the big Randstad cities.  This could redistribute 
powers between provinces and municipalities, concentrating them in new metropolitan bodies 
(Mastop, 813).  On the other hand, there is discussion of increasing provincial powers (Drenthe 
Interviews).  The provinces could assume a more dominant role by garnering executive powers from 
the national level (as part of the decentralization process) or by acquiring more directive powers over 
the municipalities (as part of efforts to address the need for regional level vision and the 
implementation gap).  It is unclear in which direction the provinces will move. 
 
Cooperation across jurisdictional lines on the basis of functional regions is being emphasized.  Vinex 
requires greater coordination between jurisdictions and non-governmental organizations (Drenthe 
Interviews).  Local governments in an urbanized area are required to coordinate on public housing, 
infrastructure, public transport, local economic development, major socio-cultural facilities, and 
uniform environmental policies.  Also, at least one metropolitan area has adopted a joint vision plan 
for regional development (the Groningen-Assen Regional Vision 2030).  This trend could address the 
need for regional coordination without creating a new level of government. 
 
The municipalities have been the recipients of devolved authority from the national level, though there 
have been some reverse currents (e.g., provincial and national powers to intervene in local planning).  
Municipalities can increasingly engage in policy entrepreneurship, developing their own separate 
approaches to development controls.  They are increasingly seeing their role as marketing their cities, 
and are becoming more accommodating to market demands.  Through Active Land policies, they have 
a lot to bring to the table as part of public-private partnerships.  On the other hand, some municipal 
governments may take a secondary role to the private sector in initiating development. 
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Increasingly, initiative is being given to the private sector for new development projects, in the hope of 
increasing the number of public-private partnerships that realize both economic and social benefits.  
As discussed above, decision-making is also becoming more inclusive of the private sector.  This 
could create room for the private sector to step into a guiding role in shaping development.  
 
Figure 5 represents an approximation of the current patterns of change.  However, it does not follow 
that the shifts will continue in their current directions indefinitely.  It seems likely that the downward 
shift of national authority will balance out with the national government still in a strong role creating 
the framework for development. 
 
The Fifth Report on Spatial Planning? 
 
As of 1998, work at the national level was underway toward developing a spatial policy for the future 
(Van Uum, 106).  There will be a partial revision of Vinex for the period up to 2010, and development 
of a new policy for the period after that.  The “Netherlands 2030” project, an open process with many 
participants, was in 1998 in the exploratory discussion phase and has developed four scenarios for the 
future.  Scenarios range from “individuals and businesses creating their own environment” (a low level 
of government intervention) to one viewing “the qualities of town and country as a collective good” 
(with a strong interventionist cast) (ibid., 108-110).  It remains to be seen which direction the system 
will move.  Van Uum postulates that because of the emphasis on sectoral integration, there is not likely 
to be a fifth solely spatial plan, but rather an integrated plan for the whole of the physical environment 
(ibid., 116).  
 
Though in the Netherlands government influence is diminishing, there is still an amazing amount of 
intervention in the physical environment compared to other countries (Faludi, 1).  Dutch institutions 
are in a time of turmoil now, and traditional ways of thinking are being questioned (e.g., the culture of 
negotiation and consensus-building) (ibid., 247).  Faludi and Van der Valk identify this as a time with 
both serious dangers to the planning system and opportunities for improving it.  Some dangers include 
a loss of identity for planning through reorganizations and departmental mergers; too much emphasis 
on protecting the environment, to the detriment of planning’s ability to adjudicate between land 
claims; less coherence in the strategic planning community (competition between national and 
provincial planners); demise of the partnership with housing and the planning control housing tools 
afford; pressures on the Green Heart; and the difficulty of finding alternatives to high government 
interventionism.  On the other hand, some opportunities include expanding the appeal of planning 
through the sustainable development movement; a new comprehensiveness, defining the domain of 
planning more broadly; new coalitions with strategic, transport and environmental planners; a new   37
partnership for planning with non-governmental organizations and green-minded businesses; and 
public-private partnerships. 
 
The central challenge facing Dutch planning is to evolve new approaches suited to a free market 
system, without losing the concern for equity that characterizes Dutch society.  Allowing greater 
market participation in shaping the built environment can undoubtedly have benefits.  However, the 
market obeys its own logic.  In areas with economic disadvantages, or in times of economic downturn, 
attracting investment will continue to be a challenge.  This applies both to competition between cities, 
and to divergent neighborhoods within urban areas.  The danger is that while the strong are getting 
stronger, the weak may also be getting weaker (Heins Interview).  It is to be expected, and even 
desired, that government and the market should engage in ongoing power exchanges, tailored to the 
needs at that time.  Planners should explore the opportunities available in adopting a more free market 
approach.  In Chapter 3, the potential of this approach will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2:       Oregon’s Growth Management Program 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will review the Oregon’s growth management system, with an emphasis on land use 
aspects.  As Chapter 1 did for the Netherlands, this chapter will focus on two things:  First, the tools 
used by spatial planning agencies to control land development.  Second, the challenges and failings of 
the system and current systemic change trends.  Again, the emphasis will be on issues related to the 
performance and operation of the system.   
 
Oregon’s growth management system has evolved considerable new authority over its nearly 30 years 
of existence.  In particular, Portland’s Metro planning agency has increased its scope and power for 
regional planning.  Criticisms have focussed on Oregon’s lack of data that would enable analysis and, 
as was the case with the Dutch planning system, on implementation problems.  Though critics claim 
that Oregon’s system is too top down and restrictive of both market forces, in fact local governments 
have a broad scope for policy entrepreneurship and business people play a prominent role in decision-
making.  
 
Section I will review the governmental and societal context of planning and provide a history of Oregonian 
growth management.  Section II will describe the governmental bodies that impact on land development, the 
tools they employ and some criticisms of the system.  Section III will provide a theoretical analysis of the 
issues discussed and explore directions the system may take in the future. 
   39
I.   Background on Oregonian Growth Management 
 
Oregon’s growth management system is considered to be one of the leading programs of its kind in the United 
States.  This section will briefly discuss the origins of the system, how and why it was created, and the 
national context within which it operates.  It will then review the scope of the system.  
 
Origins and Evolution of the Oregon System 
 
Sullivan writes that “the establishment of Oregon’s planning system in 1973 may well have been a historical 
accident” (Sullivan, 50).  Strong leadership, a receptive audience, an enlightened judiciary, and a general 
belief that planning was the way to avoid future problems all came together at the right time and place.  Other 
factors include the economic structure of the state, blessings bestowed by the topography and environment of 
the area and exposure to the growth patterns of other West Coast states.   
 
Protection for the natural environment and natural resources has long been emphasized in Oregon.  The state 
benefits from an abundance of natural resources, including excellent farm and forest land and beautiful 
scenery, including the Pacific coastline, mountains and open country to the east.  In 1938, Lewis Mumford 
visited Oregon and was deeply impressed by its natural riches (Stephenson, 5).  Concerned after having 
observed signs of neglect and misuse of Oregon’s landscape, Mumford asked members of Portland’s City 
Club, “if you are good enough to have it in your possession?  Have you enough intelligence, imagination, and 
cooperation among you to make the best use of these opportunities?”  This challenge has long resonated in 
Oregon’s cultural landscape.  Mumford is not alone in calling for the protection of Oregon’s natural resources, 
as leaders like Tom McCall have demonstrated.  
 
Another source of motivation for planning came from Oregon’s neighbors, which provided examples of the 
consequences of failing to plan for growth.  According to Carl Abbott, “in this self-satisfied picture of 
achievement by avoidance, Los Angeles has long been damned, Seattle has sold its soul, and only Portland 
still treads the straight path to good planning” (Abbott, 11).  Also, Oregon was lucky in terms of timing.  
Portland’s regional plans were put in place before the pace of development picked up, putting the city in a 
position to influence much of the urban form that now exists (Lang, 5). 
 
Oregon’s planning system was created in 1973 in the context of a national boom of interest in growth 
management which swept through several other states at that time (DeGrove and Metzger, 3).  Growth 
management is a comprehensive concept concerned not only with the physical environment but also with 
economic and social concerns.  The vision for growth management, and the Oregonian version, came out of 
the 1970s concern for the environment and natural resources.  In the 1980s and 1990s, growth management 
evolved into its current emphasis on “quality of life” (DeGrove and Metzger, 5).  As part of this evolution,   40
new concerns came under the scope of growth management.  Public frustration with traffic congestion is a 
major stimulus, as is the expansion of environmental concerns to include issues associated with urban sprawl 
(such as maintaining a clear separation between urban and rural activities).  Governments are now also 
incorporating affordable housing and economic development policies into growth management systems. 
 
Governor Tom McCall provided strong leadership to the movement for state planning in Oregon’s legislature 
(Stephenson, 8).  In 1969, McCall called for statewide mandated planning as a way to counter the “grasping 
wastrels of land,” who “mock Oregon’s status as the environmental model for the nation”.  In Portland, Mayor 
Neil Goldschmidt also provided dynamic leadership (Abbott, 22). Goldschmidt and McCall led the successful 
campaign to remove an expressway from Portland’s downtown waterfront, an achievement that convinced 
many people that it was possible to improve their communities. 
 
Since 1973, new problems have come to the public’s attention, and the growth management system has 
expanded to address them.  Since 1990, there has been a growing concern on the issue of housing affordability 
in the Portland metropolitan region (Metro website).  Problems include a widening gap between household 
income and the cost of housing; an increase in population and homelessness; rising land costs; and the lack of 
available land.  State, metropolitan and local policies are aimed at mitigating these problems.  
 
Coalitions have Shaped Oregon’s Planning System 
 
According to Christopher Leo, a wide-ranging coalition supporting growth management is required for a 
system as complex as Oregon’s (Leo, 19).  These coalitions are products of the last 30 years (Abbott, 31).  
The late 1960s brought a new generation of leaders willing to take risks and inclined toward public 
investment—attitudes that were part of a national climate of change.  In the early 1970s, Portland stood out 
“not for the content of its visions but for the effectiveness of its leaders in transforming the common vision 
into a comprehensive set of public policies and for constructing powerful political coalitions around several 
planning goals” (Abbott, 31).  In Portland, the Goldschmidt administration established an atmosphere of team 
building in public decision-making that incorporated citizen and activist groups (Abbott, 23).  Abbott reports 
that the consensus-based “Goldschmidt coalition” is still a fact of life in Portland. 
 
Oregon’s growth management coalition consists of groups with widely differing interest groups that in other 
states frequently find themselves on opposite sides of planning debates (Leo, 19).  The Oregon Farm Bureau, 
environmental activists and Portland politicians have all been equally strong supporters of growth 
management.  Leo argues that environmentalists, farmers with long-term commitment to farming, and 
business community members who “came to associate long-term competitiveness of commerce… with a 
workable and enforceable regional plan” have formed the core coalition supporting the system (Leo, 10).  
These groups have seen growth management as beneficial to them, each for their own reasons (Leo, 12).    41
Farmers receive tax benefits and protection for farmland through zoning.  Environmentalists obtain a structure 
for legal protection of natural areas.  Business people obtain speed of review and approvals, certainty in how 
the system will work, and costs that so far have not been unreasonable.  The ongoing series of compromises 
between these and other interests forged the system over 30 years (Leo, 4).  This feature is a key to 
understanding Oregon’s success, as well as some of the problems it faces (see below). 
 
An example of Oregon’s unusual coalition style is the fact that environmentalists and developers, typically on 
opposite sides of development debates, often agree in Oregon (Leo, 13).  An alliance was forged between 
developers and 1000 Friends of Oregon, an environmental protection advocacy group that has been a 
powerful force in shaping Portland’s planning, after battling on opposite sides of an attempt to repeal the state 
land use statutes in 1967.  After the attempt was narrowly defeated, 1000 Friends came to understand that in 
order to make protecting rural and forest areas politically feasible, growth would have to be accommodated in 
urban areas.  Developers, for their part, came to respect the influence that 1000 Friends could wield.  
Subsequently, 1000 Friends has opposed restrictions to housing inside Portland’s Urban Growth Boundary 
(UGB), and environmentalists and builders have frequently been allies.  
 
Linking environmental and development interests is a highly effective feature of Oregon planning.  The 
Oregon system stands out for its assertion that growth and growth management are two sides of the same coin.  
This approach has succeeded in turning potential adversaries to growth management into supporters or at least 
convincing them not to oppose the system.  Oregon’s planning participants have shown skill in bringing such 
potential enemies on board.  
 
 
•  The Domain of Planning in Oregon 
 
This section discusses the place accorded to planning in the national context and in the state of Oregon.  It 
reviews the roles planning is expected to play and provides an introduction to the approach used by the state 
of Oregon.  
 
The U.S. Context for Growth Management 
 
At this time, there is little direction from the U.S. national government for land use planning.  In this 
predominantly free market system, emphasis is placed on allowing the market to take its course rather than 
employing governmental interventionist policies.  The unsuccessful National Land Use Policy Act, introduced 
in various forms between 1968 and 1976, would have institutionalized a state/national planning process to 
balance environmental protection with mandated local acceptance of regionally necessary growth.  Instead, 
the state and local levels are the arena for land use planning (Bollens, 143).  However, a number of federal   42
policies indirectly impact on land development.  These include the national highway system, which directs 
development location, environmental policies such as the Environmental Protection Act, Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act, and the national tax system (Nivola, 12).   
 
Though not directed at land use, these federal policies create a national framework within which land use 
planning takes place.  Judged by the standards of growth management, livability or sustainability, some 
impacts have been undesirable.  For example, the emphasis placed in transportation funding on 
accommodating the automobile and some tax structures have both fostered urban sprawl (Nivola, 12).  During 
the 1990s, Congress has addressed some of these criticisms by reforming the capital gains tax and by passing 
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Enhancement Act (ISTEA) and the Transportation Enhancement Act 
(TEA-21), which have redirected some transportation funding toward non-car infrastructure.  The President’s 
Council on Sustainable Development and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Sustainable 
Development Challenge Grants are part of a trend toward strengthening the national framework for 
environmental and planning issues (Beatley, 365).  Other programs, such as Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), could provide programmatic examples for future planning programs at the national level.   
 
State and local level interest in growth management is strong in some places.  The purpose of growth 
management is to balance public objectives for economic growth with protection of the environment (as well 
as considering social aspects) (Jay Stein, vii).  This is a new role for government in the U.S., making this a 
paradoxical time.  While the 1990s were supposedly a conservative political era, states nonetheless expanded 
their interventionist role. 
 
Oregon’s Comprehensive Approach 
 
According to Scott Bollens, “state and regional growth management programs have dual missions addressing 
the geographical mismatch between the municipal control of growth and the regional incidence of growth 
effects (Bollens, 143).  They seek both to restrict growth having regionally detrimental effects and to facilitate 
regionally beneficial growth often opposed by local governments”.  Trying both to restrict “bad growth” and 
to foster “good growth” has produced frequent conflicts.  To avoid such conflicts, most state planning and 
growth management programs have focused on preventing undesirable growth rather than facilitating needed 
development (ibid., 148).  However, from the start Oregon focused on both of these goals as part of a 
comprehensive approach to planning.  
 
Oregon is a leader in the areas of land use, comprehensive planning and growth management (DeGrove and 
Metzger, 6).  The state goals encompass a broad range of issues, including the environment, housing, the 
economy and transportation.  Senate Bill 100 (the enabling legislature passed in 1973) gave state planning a 
broad scope, and it has had relative success.  Oregon has pioneered in the area of compact urban development.    43
The state has also been a leader in formulating affordable housing strategies.  Oregon’s system continues to 
evolve (Howe 1993, 67).  In 1990, Oregon made its first state coastal resource management plan.  Portland 
provides many of Oregon’s leading edge examples, including its 2040 Framework Plan, its Greenspaces 
Plan, redevelopment plans for depressed areas and a strong housing emphasis.  Portland Metro Planning 
Agency is continuing to evolve and acquire new powers and responsibilities for its region.   
 
 
II.  Land Development Controls in Oregon  
 
This section will review the approaches and policy tools that make up Oregon’s land use planning system.  
The first section describes the distribution of governmental responsibilities between national, state, 
metropolitan and local government.  The next three sections will review the state, metropolitan and local 
governmental “tool kits” and approaches. 
 
•  Breakdown of Government Responsibilities 
 
National government creates a loose framework within which states and localities have a lot of room to move.  
As discussed above, there is a loose federal framework within which land use planning operates.  This 
framework includes the body of national land use law as well as those federal programs that impact on land 
use patterns (discussed above).   
 
In the U.S., state governments have wide discretion in setting up land development policies. Oregon adopted a 
“federal” approach to land use planning  (Sullivan, 49).  The state sets up mandatory goals for local 
governments, and administrative rules to elaborate on or interpret the goals.  A key requirement is that local 
governments establish UGBs to direct development to locations that comply with state goals.  The state goals 
create a framework for local planning, setting a minimum level of compliance in goal implementation. The 
state then monitors local implementation and can take enforcement action.  The setup calls for an integrated 
framework between the levels of government (DeGrove and Metzger, 3). 
 
Municipal and county (local) governments are required to adopt comprehensive plans that spell out standards 
for development.  Those standards must be implemented through zoning, land division and other regulations.  
Local governments have the authority to approve proposed land development projects.  They can formulate 
their own plans.  However, plans must be in accordance with state goals and acknowledged by the state.  
Thus, local governments are free within the context of the state framework to direct their own development. 
Local governments receive some state funding for projects, and this is a tool to motivate them to comply with 
state goals (Sullivan, 49). 
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Oregon’s planning system is heavily influenced by private interest groups and individuals concerned with 
application and enforcement of state policy or who want to motivate public agencies to move in a particular 
direction (Sullivan, 49).  The foremost example of this type of organization is 1000 Friends of Oregon (a 
group established in 1975 by outgoing Governor Tom McCall to monitor the planning system).  1000 Friends 
uses the court systems to strategically challenge local government actions and the state in order to clarify 
policies and set precedents for the entire state.  It also conducts studies, lobbies the state and provides 
technical assistance to the state and local governments. 
 
•  State Level Planning 
 
Mandated Statewide Planning 
 
In 1973, the Oregon state legislature established mandatory planning for all incorporated cities and for 
counties in Oregon (Abbott, 28).  All cities and counties are required to adopt land use plans that concord with 
the 19 state goals (Howe 1993, 62).  Goals address planning process, conservation, development, housing, 
transportation and coastal resources.  Conformance with goals defines state planning—there is no state plan.  
The state reviews city and county land use plans for compliance, then “acknowledges” those plans that 
comply.  Local planning and implementation is subject to “periodic review” every 5 to 7 years.  The state can 
require locals to update plans to reflect changes in state goals, administrative rules or local needs.  
Coordination is a key aspect of the system.  Counties are responsible for coordinating the plans of cities and 
service districts in their jurisdiction.  State agency plans must be consistent with state goals and with 
acknowledged local plans.  In the late 1980s, DLCD focussed on state agency coordination, and in 1990 20 of 
26 agencies were certified (this process was more time consuming than expected). 
 
To administer planning at the state level, the legislature created the seven member Land Conservation and 
Development Commission (LCDC), which is appointed by the governor (Abbott, 28).  LCDC provides 
municipalities with legal support for zoning and other growth management tools.  It also approves and 
monitors local planning and can withhold grants and require local governments to revise plans that fail to take 
sufficient steps toward fulfilling the state goals (Leo, 62).  LCDC also provides local governments with 
planning guidelines and is responsible for certifying that plans for different jurisdictions and service areas are 
coordinated (Abbott, 28).  LCDC oversees the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD), 
the state agency that administers the program (Howe 1993, 62).   
 
The 1973 legislation made zoning and other forms of land development regulation subordinate to 
comprehensive plans.  Subsequently, landmark legal cases (Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Washington County and Baker v. City of Milwaukie) have established the legality of this approach (Sullivan,   45
51).  Thus, comprehensive plans truly represent the legal framework within which development must take 
place.  
 
Oregon has a “multi-tiered system of consistency” requirements (Nelson and Duncan, 29).  First, zoning, 
subdivision, site plan and special permits must be consistent with local plans, which prevail if there is a 
discrepancy.  Second, in the Portland area local plans must be consistent with the regional plan.  Third, all 
local and regional plans must be consistent with state goals and policies.  State and local governments work 
together in planning activities, and state agencies play a strong role.  Thus, planning in Oregon is vertically 
integrated (at least ideally). 
 
Oregon’s growth management system is also horizontally integrated.  Planning for separate sectors is 
conducted as part of a comprehensive process.  The state’s goals explicitly require that planning take on a 
comprehensive approach to growth controls by placing equal weight on economic, environmental and social 
considerations (Leo, 9).  According to Leo, in planning for redevelopment, transportation and housing, local 
and statewide planning has become fully integrated (ibid., 10).  
 
As of 1986, 10 years after original deadline, all 242 local governments and 36 counties had acknowledged 
comprehensive plans (Howe 1993, 65).  It took longer than expected to clarify policies and resolve UGB 
conflicts and the extent and location of exception lands (see local planning section).  The state forced a 
number of local governments to comply through use of enforcement orders, withholding funding and one 
court order.  There was substantial controversy during this process, including three ballot box challenges, all 
defeated by a margin of 10 percent or more.   
 
The Appeal Process 
In 1979, the state established the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) (Howe 1993, 62).  This three-member 
tribunal makes legal rulings on land use matters.  An appeal of a local land use change would go first to 
LUBA, then to the court of appeals, then to the state supreme court.  The State exercises its oversight 
authority rarely; LUBA has only heard an average of eleven appeals per year.  However, Armstrong and 
Jacobs argue that the power to do so has a significant impact on local behavior (Armstrong, 5). 
 
Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) 
The state requires all incorporated cities to draw UGBs around their land area (Kline, 2).  The goals of UGBs 
are “the orderly and efficient transition of rural lands to urban uses, the protection of agricultural lands, and 
the protection of forests”.  UGBs are required by state law to encompass a supply of land that is adequate for 
growth needs for 20 years, but that can also be efficiently serviced with infrastructure (Leo, 7).  Local 
governments must estimate how many people are expected to live and work there in 20 years, then make sure 
there is enough land to house those people (Metro website).  UGBs effectively create two land markets, with   46
land valued considerably higher within the UGB than outside of the boundary (Kline, 2).  Local governments 
and the Portland metropolitan government are required by the state to create Urban Reserve areas (UGB Fact 
Sheet, Metro).  These are adjacent rural lands that could potentially be incorporated into the UGB over next 
50 years.   
 
Unique to the Oregon system is the allowance of exception areas outside of UGBs that are nonetheless 
allowed to develop in ways other than agricultural use or rural residential (Abbott, 29).  In these 
unincorporated rural areas, low density residential, commercial or industrial development is allowed.  Stated 
another way, within the UGB the burden of proof is on opponents of development.  Outside the UGB, the 
burden of proof is on developers to show that land can be easily supplied with services and not worth 
retention as farmland.  Easley points out that extending UGBs can create legal issues relating to property 
owners in areas to be incorporated in the UGB (Easley, 10).  LCDC has developed guidelines that streamline 
the extension process and are intended to protect governments from legal challenges.  
 
Summary 
Since its inception in 1973, state mandated planning has rapidly evolved from a reaction to pressures on 
farmlands to proactive planning for urban form (Abbott, 28).  It has survived numerous legal challenges and 
three statewide referenda.  Voter initiatives have been a key source of legitimization for the system (Leo, 17).  
Two goals have been primary:  The containment of urban sprawl and the preservation of forests and farmland.  
The former necessitates UGBs beyond which public facilities will not be extended.  The latter entails 
designation of exclusive farm use areas and prime resource areas (Nelson and Duncan, 22).  
 
•  Portland Metropolitan Area Planning 
 
The Portland region receives a lot of national attention for its cutting edge planning and livability efforts 
(2040 Framework, Fall 1996/Winter 1997, 15).  As the primate city in Oregon, Portland, and its region, 
presents an interesting planning model.  Portland’s size and urban character, as well as its unusual inter-
jurisdictional governing system, make it stand out.  Further, because of the prominence of the Portland area 
within the state, it is difficult to discuss growth management on a statewide level without discussing the 
Portland experience.  In Portland area, there are 132 special service districts inside or immediately adjacent to 
the UGB (Howe 1993, 67). 
 
Portland Metro Planning Agency 
 
Portland’s Metro Planning Agency (Metro) is growing in planning importance (Abbott, 26).  Created by 
referendum in 1978, Metro was given home rule charter in 1992.  Metro’s jurisdiction extends over seven 
districts comprising the urbanized portions of Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas Counties.  Metro was   47
the first popularly elected regional government in an inter-jurisdictional metropolitan area (Leo, 5), and is the 
only regional governmental agency with an executive director and a legislative council elected directly (the 
Metro Council) (Abbott, 26).  Its responsibilities include management and provision of several services (zoo, 
regional parks, and garbage disposal), setting standards for water quality and sensitive environmental areas, 
and regional transportation and land use planning.  Metro has the power to adopt and enforce regional plans 
setting densities and specific housing allocations in the region’s 24 cities as well as the legal authority to 
require local implementation of its regional land use plans (Abbott, 26). 
 
As part of its overall land use policy, Metro requires that local governments meet minimum density 
requirements for zoning districts (Howe 1993, 69).  Metro requires municipalities to zone for 6 to 10 overall 
dwellings per acre for the net total of residentially developable land.  At least half of this zoning must allow 
multifamily or attached single family.  Local governments are also required to define the local need for 
affordable housing and to provide a mix of housing densities in order to meet it (DeGrove and Metzger, 6). 
These policies are efforts to address the need for affordable housing in a proactive fashion. 
 
Portland Metropolitan Area Urban Growth Boundary (UGB) 
Metro adopted the Portland area UGB in 1979 (Leo, 7).  Easley credits Metro’s UGB with bringing 
predictability to development applications and shortening and streamlining the development review process 
(Easley, 17).  The Metro Code requires Metro to review the capacity of the UGB every five years to see if it is 
in compliance with the requirement that it contain a 20-year supply of buildable land (Metro website).  Until 
its recent expansion, the size of the growth boundary was 223,000 acres (Stephenson, 14).  Since 1997, more 
areas have been added.  As of September, 1999, the Portland region UGB encompassed 236,150 acres (Leo, 
7).  In 1997, Metro voted to designate 18,000 acres of land outside the UGB as urban reserves (equivalent to 8 
percent of the area currently in the UGB), to be incorporated in the near future (Stephenson, 14).   
 
The Portland area UGB can be amended in three ways:  The Metro Council can enact a Legislative 
Amendment when it is demonstrated that growth is more than was expected when the boundary was drawn 
(UGB Fact Sheet, Metro).  Local governments can enact a Locational Adjustment for an area under 20 acres in 
size.  Or, local government can enact a Major Amendment for larger areas, which is required to follow the 
same procedures as the Legislative Amendment.  Metro has a quasi-judicial process for hearing UGB petitions.  
Before the UGB can be amended, changes must be shown to be in compliance with existing plans that impact 
how much buildable land is available (Metro website). 
 
While UGBs do prevent rampant development in rural areas outside the boundary, they do little to control the 
character of development inside their boundaries.  Leo argues that Portland and Metro have built upon the 
effects of the UGB by taking a variety of transportation, housing and development measures to address 
growth patterns within the boundary (Leo, 7).  However, Easley points out evidence of sprawl-type   48
development there (Easley, 18).  Portland has not met its density goals; as of 1992 the average density inside 
the boundary was 5 dwellings per acre, rather than 6 to 10 which is the planned target density.  Single-family 
developments as of 1992 were at only 68 percent of allowable densities, while multi-family was at 80 percent.  
Failure to achieve target densities added to the pressure to extend the UGB, as Metro did in 1997 and after. 
 
Because of rural exception areas, UGBs do not prevent all growth outside their area.  Between 1985 and 1989 
nine percent of Portland area single-family units and 5 percent of multi-family units were built outside the 
UGB (though no significant nonresidential development occurred outside) (Easley, 18).  This performance 
raises two concerns.  First, the exception area policy may be too loose, creating a loophole in the UGB policy.  
Second, much of the rural exception areas in which growth occurred are immediately adjacent to the UGB, 
creating a political obstacle to boundary expansion and future provision of services to those areas.  Nelson and 
Moore reiterate this concern, describing a “low-density residential ring around much of the UGB” (Nelson 
and Moore, 300). 
 
Relationship between the State and Metro 
In its oversight capacity, the state can intervene in local land use policy changes.  It recently did intervene in 
Metro’s UGB amendment process (Metro website).  An Oregon Court of Appeals decision of January, 2000 
upheld a decision by LUBA that said Metro erred in the way it designated urban reserves in 1997.  In 
particular, the court said Metro included resource (mostly farm) land that should not have been included 
before the region used up available non-resource (exception) land.  This power to intervene, though seldom 
used, can have a strong influence on local behavior. 
 
Portland Region 2040 Plan 
In 1989, it became apparent that Metro needed broader powers (Howe 1993, 67).  Metro and policy-makers 
came to realize that despite their efforts, the area was developing in the same way as most other U.S. regions.  
In 1990, Metro conducted the first thorough attempt to gauge progress, and identified several problems:  
Residential and employment growth was occurring largely in the suburbs.  Low-density development of rural 
land outside UGB was occurring and would block future UGB expansions.  Traffic from and between suburbs 
was increasing.  Finally, growth was occurring mostly on vacant land, not as infill.  Out of concern for these 
trends, the citizens of the Portland region gave Metro home rule charter in 1992 (giving it power to enact 
binding plans) and instructed it to create a strengthened vision plan for the region’s growth.  In order to better 
address long-term growth, Metro took a 50-year view of planning (Abbott, 31).  This was the beginning of the 
Metro 2040 planning process  
 
The Region 2040 planning process went through several steps over the 1990s.  Metro adopted the Region 
2040 Growth Concept in December, 1994 (Abbott, 31).  The Growth Concept is based on Metro’s prediction 
that by 2040 up to a million more residents may live in the four core counties of the Portland UGB.  To   49
accommodate them, the Growth Concept adopts a vision of compact cities:  New jobs and housing will be 
focused in downtown Portland, in other urban and suburban centers and along transportation corridors.  
Densities called for by the plan are fairly high by U.S. standards.  Downtown residential density will rise from 
150 persons per acre in 1990 to 250 persons per acre in 2040.  Corresponding increases are indicated for other 
urban and suburban centers, transit corridors, employment centers and inner and outer residential areas.  Even 
outer ring neighborhoods will be rather dense, increasing from 10 dwellings per acre in 1990 to 13 in 2040.  
To support the compact city policies, transportation goals are shifted to emphasize transit.  The Growth 
Concept also calls for strengthening protections for rural areas.  It identifies rural reserves that are to remain 
permanently outside the UGB.  
 
Meanwhile, during the first half of the 1990s, rapid population growth in the Portland area exceeded 
expectations.  More than 130,000 new people moved to the Portland region between 1993 and 1998 (Metro 
Facts, Fall 1998).  In 1996, at the request of local governments trying to deal with the rapid growth, Metro 
took an interim step.  While work continued on the final 2040 Framework Plan, Metro adopted its Urban 
Growth Management Functional Plan (2040 Framework Fall 1997, 2).  The Functional Plan was the first 
regional planning tool that had force of law.  It required local governments to change some ordinances to 
address specific issues.  The Functional plan facilitated more efficient use of land by setting population and 
job target capacities for each city and the urban portion of each county.  These targets are based on vacant 
land and redevelopment and infill opportunities within each jurisdiction’s borders.  Each jurisdiction agreed to 
help prevent sprawl by designing compact communities and absorbing their fair share of growth efficiently. 
 
The Metro Council adopted the final Region 2040 Framework Plan on December 11, 1997.  The 2040 
Framework Plan brings together contents of previous regional policies such as the Future Vision, the 
Regional Urban Growth Goals and Objectives, the 2040 Growth Concept and the Urban Growth 
Management Functional Plan (2040 Framework, Fall 1997, 3).  Intended to help coordinate a consistent 
approach to issues of regional significance, the Framework Plan provides set of priorities, performance 
measures, and recommendations for local governments to use.  It also adds new policies on affordable 
housing, schools, environmental education and water quality and supply.  
 
Some Comments on the 2040 Framework Plan 
The 2040 Framework Plan represents a new, strengthened role for Metro in shaping regional growth.  By 
planning for a 50-year period and permanently protecting prime open spaces, Region 2040 is addressing two 
of Nelson and Moore’s concerns regarding the long-term viability of the UGB.  First, longer range planning 
should make accommodations for future needs for developable lands. Second, protecting some areas outside 
the UGB permanently will at least for the next 50 years prevent expansion of the low-density residential ring 
developing around the UGB (Nelson and Moore, 300).   
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Critics of the plan argue that proposed densities are unworkable and undesirable in terms of the quality of life 
of residents (Oliver).  One newspaper article cited a developer and plan opponent who claims that much of the 
land that Metro is counting as buildable within the UGB and appropriate for high densities is actually on 
slopes which would prevent those densities from being achieved.  One might question whether the political 
will exists to back density goals, given the fact that the Portland area had not achieved its density goals for its 
last plan as of 1992 (Easley, 18).  Failure to do so might entail future unplanned UGB expansions, as well as 
greater difficulty in achieving the compact urban form called for by Region 2040, weakening its legitimacy as 
a guiding document. 
 
•  Local Land Use Planning  
 
In this section, the role of local governments as the implementers of state growth management policies will be 
discussed.  Both municipalities and counties create local land use plans in Oregon.  Counties plan for 
urbanized areas that are not part of incorporated cities.  Counties are also responsible for seeing to it that the 
land use and service plans for the jurisdictions and service areas within their jurisdiction are coordinated 
(Howe 1993, 62).   
 
Local Land Use Planning Requirements 
 
As discussed above, each city is required to draft a comprehensive plan and to have it approved by LCDC.  
Each must also create a UGB with enough land for the next 20 years of growth.  Within UGBs, undeveloped 
and agricultural land inside the boundary is designated as “urbanizable” (Howe 1993, 64).  Comprehensive 
plans must include measures to control the process of parcelization of this land in order to enable efficient 
infrastructure provision.  Each city and the county that surrounds it must coordinate planning for 
unincorporated areas inside the UGB (in Portland, Metro governs the UGB).   
 
Outside the UGB, the two primary zoning districts are Exclusive Farm Use (EFU) and Forest Land (Howe 
1993, 64).  Counties must consider for EFU zoning all lands designated by the Soil Conservation Service as 
prime for that purpose as well as land that has available irrigation water, is suitability for grazing or is part of 
an existing farm unit.  Forest Land zoning is used to protect all forested land and also to protect areas with 
soil, air, water and fish resources.  Areas adjacent to forests that are necessary for forest operations are also 
designated as Forest Land.  Uses permitted in EFU or Forest Land must support resource management.  
Dwellings not related to those functions are allowed as a conditional use and are subject to extra impact 
restrictions.   
 
After EFU and Forest Land areas have been designated, counties can set aside Exception Land (Howe 1993, 
64).  Exception zones are areas where agriculture and forest activities are not viable or appropriate.  In these   51
areas, urban development is permitted.  Counties must justify why land is not appropriate for forest or 
agricultural use.  They can justify Exception Land designation if existing uses on the site or adjacent to it 
preclude agricultural or forest activities, or if there are other reasons the resource protection goals should not 
apply.  The purpose of the Exception Land designation is to accommodate needed development in rural areas.   
 
The Land Approval Process 
 
Administrative rules detail the process for local review of proposals (Howe 1993, 68).  Public input is built in, 
but the public cannot control the process because all decisions are based on findings of fact.  Local 
governments are required to take action within four months.  The emphasis on precise standards and 
procedures means greater certainty for developers.  Howe suggests that these features may have increased 
Oregon’s attractiveness for industrial and economic development.  The emphasis on precise standards and 
fact-based decisions also seems to reduce the number of appeals (about 1 percent of appealable decisions are 
appealed). 
 
Local Government Initiative within a State Framework 
 
Local governments must meet the minimum requirement of compliance with state goals, locate development 
within UGBs and follow procedural requirements.  Cities and counties in the Portland region have additional 
requirements from Metro, such as setting minimum density standards residential zones (Metro website).  
However, within that framework they still have considerable discretion in formulating policy.   
 
For example, the City of Portland has engaged in local policy entrepreneurship for promoting economic 
growth.  An industrial sanctuary policy creates a zoning overlay district protecting inner city manufacturing 
and warehousing from incompatible uses like big box retail, thus supporting those uses in remaining in the 
center city (Abbott, 17).  Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has been the primary financing mechanism for 
redevelopment in Portland and has resulted in “an onslaught of new development” (Nelson and Duncan, 130).  
Thus, top down techniques such as required state goals, performance standards are balanced by the fact that 
initiative for development comes from local governments and the private sector, a bottom up orientation. 
 
The City of Portland has also taken steps to promote higher densities, while encouraging developers to 
provide public amenities.  Density bonuses, for the area described by Portland’s Central City Plan, 1988, are 
available for developers who provide public amenities including daycare, retail, public art, rooftop gardens, 
theaters, water features and residential units in mixed use projects (Lassar, 20).  Thus, Portland employs a 
balance of regulating and incentive tools. 
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•  Positive Results and Ongoing Challenges 
 
This section will broadly outline the state’s goals for transportation, economic development, the environment, 
housing and urban form.  In Oregon’s comprehensive system, these sectors are closely linked to spatial 
planning.  Then the on-the-ground results of Oregon’s planning system will be discussed for the Portland 
region.  Focus is on this region because of its relative importance in terms of population, because it has been 
on the cutting edge of state planning and, finally, because there is less data available for other areas. 
 
Transportation Planning in Oregon 
 
Oregon’s Goal 12 aims to provide a “safe, convenient and economic transportation system,” and instructs 
communities to address the needs of the “transportation disengaged” (LCDC website).  LCDC requires that 
local jurisdictions make transportation plans that will accomplish a 20 percent reduction in vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) per capita over next 20 years (Abbott, 30).  Abbott states that, “it makes local land use 
planners and the Oregon Department of Transportation into allies while the federal Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Enhancement Act is forcing highway builders to rethink their jobs”.  This represents a major 
reversal of the long-standing national emphasis on car mobility.  As part of its comprehensive approach, 
Oregon has created a clear link between transportation and land use planning and is placing emphasis on 
getting people out of their cars. 
 
Transportation Planning in Portland 
Starting in the early 1970s, Portland has taken decisive steps toward a less auto-oriented transportation 
network.  Portland built a downtown transit mall, removed a waterfront auto expressway and established Tri-
Met, the transit agency that today operates the city’s light rail system—MAX (Abbott, 26).  The MAX light-
rail network began with an east-side line in 1986.  Since, a west-side extension is under construction and a 
north-south line is in planning stage.  Statewide, voters approved funding for the first two projects.  However, 
state voters rejected a state contribution to the north-south line.  Meanwhile, MAX has spawned a corridor of 
economic development along its existing lines (stores reported 20 to 50 percent increases in sales in MAX’s 
first year) (Leo, 9).  From 1990-96, transit ridership increased by 24 percent to 50 million rides per year 
(Framework 2040 Fall 1997, 11).  However, auto usage also increased during that time. Because of national 
trends toward de-centralization and auto dependence, meeting the state’s transportation goal of 20 percent less 
VMT in 20 years may prove to be infeasible. 
 
Oregon’s Economic Development 
 
Oregon’s growth management system is not antigrowth (Leo, 6).  Rather, it seeks to promote development by 
maintaining an attractive environment—to manage growth in order to promote it.  This is a key part of   53
Oregon’s comprehensive approach.  In fact, Leo argues that economic development is the chief aim of the 
core coalition controlling the growth management regime in Portland.  Oregon’s Goal 9 calls for economic 
diversification and improvement (LCDC website).  Further, it asks communities to take inventory of 
commercial and industrial land, project future needs for such lands, and plan and zone enough land to meet 
those needs.  The fact that a primary source of support for growth management has from the beginning been 
the business community supports the view that Oregon’s system is receptive to growth. 
 
Economy of the Portland Area 
By most indications, downtown Portland is doing quite well, especially when compared to other large cities.  
According to Abbott, central Portland has retained its economic and institutional dominance within the region 
(Abbott, 13).  Central Portland’s office core has increased job totals and upgraded average job quality over the 
past 20 years.  The central district also has an unusually high share of office space within region—in 1989 the 
center had 66 percent of class A space, while the average downtown share for all large markets is 40 percent.  
Downtown’s share of retail sales is decreasing, but remaining strong overall as it shifts toward an increasingly 
upscale orientation.  The vacancy rate for retail space was four percent in 1995.  Finally, the number of jobs in 
the core census tracts is increasing.  In 1994 alone, major employment centers within two miles of downtown 
added 100,000 new jobs (Nelson and Duncan, 130).  On the other hand, Leo argues that high housing costs 
downtown and the predominance of suburban sprawl have meant that inner-city streets are largely empty well 
before midnight (Leo, 4). 
 
Unlike many U.S. cities, Portland does not have a “dead zone” of declined industrial and residential areas 
surrounding its downtown (Abbott, 16).  Rather than the typical American pattern in which older central 
neighborhoods either gentrify or are abandoned, Portland has seen little gentrification or abandonment, but 
instead steadier and more gradual reinvestment.  Downtown is bordered by a number of viable residential 
areas of a variety of incomes, including upper income areas.  Middle ring streetcar suburbs continue to 
support unusually strong neighborhood business districts and good public schools, and there is no evidence of 
flight from these areas to private or suburban school districts (Abbott, 17).  It should be noted that race plays a 
relatively minor role in Portland, which is one of the whitest large cities in the U.S. (minorities comprised 7.8 
percent in the core counties of Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas in 1980 and 11.4 percent in 1990) 
(Abbott, 19).  In contrast to other cities, white flight has not been a cause of a shift toward suburban housing 
(Abbott, 26).  Outer ring suburbs have 65 percent of the population of the primary MSA and 45 percent of 
MSA jobs.  However, they do not rival downtown in terms of providing concentrated job or activity centers 
(Abbott, 18). 
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Environmental Planning in Oregon 
 
From the beginning, Oregon emphasized environmental protection as part of its comprehensive state planning.  
Oregon’s state goals place a heavy emphasis on preserving environmental quality and protecting sensitive and 
scenic areas.  These goals require that pertinent areas be inventoried, that attempts be made to preserve 
sensitive or scenic areas, and that plans be developed or zoning put into place to address needs for 
environmental protection and maintenance of open space or recreation areas.  
 
The Environment in the Portland Area 
Metro is active in planning for the protection of environmentally sensitive areas within the UGB (Stephenson, 
14).  In 1992, Metro made a Greenspaces Master Plan for a cooperative regional system of parks, natural 
areas, open space, trails and greenways (2040 Framework, Fall 1996/Winter 1997, 4).  Although a 1992 
referendum for $200 million for parklands site acquisition failed, voters in 1995 gave Metro a $136 million 
bond issue to acquire parklands (Abbott, 34).  Despite acquisition programs, however, open space sites are 
being lost at an unprecedented rate (Stephenson, 12).  Planning to protect sensitive areas has not always been 
effective.  For example, Region 2040 designated 16,000 acres of environmentally sensitive land as 
unbuildable.  However, Metro did not adopt regulatory provisions to protect wetlands until June of 1998.  
Since 1990, 1,100 housing units were constructed on floodplains within the UGB.   
 
Housing Planning in Oregon 
 
The 1980s saw a decline in federal spending on affordable housing, though housing problems persisted 
(Connerly, 185).  This shifted the arena for public housing to the state and local levels.  Under Oregon’s Goal 
10, each city is required to “plan for and accommodate needed housing, to inventory buildable residential 
lands and to zone enough land to meet those needs” (LCDC website).  State planning requirements also 
prohibit localities from excluding any needed housing type.  Coupled with UGBs, Goal 10 mandates that each 
community take on a “fair share” of each type of housing unit (Abbott, 29).  The phrase “needed units” in 
LCDC’s regulations explicitly includes government-assisted housing, attached and detached single-family 
units, multi-family units, manufactured homes, and owned and rental property (Leo, 6). 
 
Promoting high-density housing is one of the most politically difficult goals of a growth management system 
(Leo, 6).  Current residents frequently fear density and react in NIMBY fashion.  Also, critics argue that 
growth management systems, inasmuch as they limit land supply, drive up the cost of housing.  Finally, as 
noted above, critics of compact urban form policies frequently argue that housing consumers do not desire to 
live in high-density neighborhoods (developer perceptions of market preferences are one reason density goals 
in the Portland area have not been met).  On the other hand, Leo argues that including provisions to maintain a 
supply of affordable housing is crucial to maintenance of political support for the growth management system.    55
The system facilitates this by providing local planners with backup from LCDC on approving politically 
unpopular higher density projects. 
 
Housing in the Portland Region 
Metro and local governments have taken steps toward promoting housing affordability and maintaining a 
variety of housing choices.  These include supporting community development corporations; provisions that 
allow accessory units to be built in single-family residential zones; community development block grants; and 
density increases (Metro Housing Needs Analysis Final Draft,  1997).  Despite these efforts, affordability 
continues to be a major issue in the Portland area.  Though housing costs are still below most other large West 
Coast cities, Abbott asserts that there is a “serious shortage of affordable housing” in Portland (Abbott, 34).  
In constant dollars, median sale price of a single-family house in the Portland area increased by 50 percent 
from 1988 to 1995.  Less fashionable areas are rapidly closing the price gap with areas that have historically 
been more expensive.   
 
Affordability will increasingly be an issue in Portland, given that real annual income per worker has not 
recovered from mid-1980s lows (Abbott, 13).  By 1995, the availability of affordable housing was 
compounded by a 2.5 percent annual increase in population (Metro Housing Needs Analysis Final Draft,  
1997).  During the period from 1990 to 1995, the region experienced an annual increase in real housing prices 
close to 10 percent per year.  Metro asserts that those facing the most severe cost burdens are low-income 
groups (Metro Housing Needs Analysis Final Draft,  1997).  The Portland region has clearly made the 
connection between land use patterns, density and affordability.  However, that approach probably not 
sufficient to ensure that low-income groups have adequate housing.  An increase in means tested subsidies 
could be put in place to fill the gap. 
 
Urban Form that complies with State Goals 
 
Oregon’s growth management system is generally credited with shaping urban form, containing development 
and preserving prime farm and forest land (Weitz, 64).  More than 90 percent of new residents between 1980 
and 1989 located inside UGBs.  Still, there are significant problems, including the low-density ring near the 
UGB and the failure to achieve target densities inside the UGB.  Also, the Portland region may be losing its 
safety valve—Clark County, Washington has been the fastest-growing segment of the Portland metro area 
(Abbott, 37).  Now Washington state’s Growth Management Act, passed in 1990, will begin limiting 
development in Clark County, with unknown effects on the Portland area. 
 
Weitz and Moore discuss the need for methods to assess the success of growth management (Weitz, 64).  
Oregon’s goals are relatively silent on what should happen inside UGBs.  Goal 14 specifies that UGBs should 
be located based on the “maximum efficiency of land use”.  What defines efficiency in this case is not   56
specifically stated.  Furthermore, the absence of a database on land use patterns and changes makes assessing 
the system’s results difficult.   
 
Because planners and policy-makers perceived that UGBs were not achieving optimum performance, 
Oregon’s Department of Transportation and DLCD created the Transportation and Growth Management 
(TGM) program in 1993 to identify ways to improve growth management. TGM sponsored a study that 
looked at residential development over a five-year period (1990-1995) in three UGBs.  Though Oregon’s 
goals do not explicitly call for contiguous development, Weitz and Moore suggest that contiguity of new 
developments to existing ones is implied by several state goals.  Building on the TGM study, Weitz and 
Moore created a rating system for urban form, rating development that takes place inside urban cores as most 
desirable and development not contiguous or within one quarter mile of existing development as least 
desirable.  Their assessment found that recent development inside three Oregon UGBs has tended to be 
contiguous to the urban core rather than dispersed, though they note that there is considerable room for 
improvement.  Perhaps addition of new growth management tools, being explored by TGM, will help to 
improve growth management performance.  Still, until some methodology for measuring the effectiveness of 
growth management techniques in employed, it will be difficult to identify new policies to address the 
system’s current shortcomings. 
 
•  Summary 
 
Oregon’s growth management program has made major strides toward achievement of its goals relating to 
land use planning.  Oregon has been successful at diffusing state policies to the local level (Howe 1993, 65).  
State involvement in approving local plans has caused locals to draw tighter UGBs than they would have, to 
designate less exception land, to allow for higher densities and more diverse housing stock, and to increase the 
amount of land zoned for industry.  Unfortunately, the system suffers from a lack of hard data on its results.  
However, it is clear that in each sector, there is room for considerable improvement.  Though Oregon is out-
performing other states, and is ahead of where it would be without growth management, it has only been able 
to slow trends toward urban sprawl and car mobility.  The 2040 Framework Plan process has taken positive 
steps toward concentrating power at the regional level.  However, in the Portland area and throughout the 
state, there may be a need for strengthened planning power and new policy tools that can be used to work 
toward goal achievement. 
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III.  Improving Oregon’s Growth Management Program 
 
This section will summarize some of the challenges and shortcomings of Oregon’s planning system.  Then it 
will discuss the balance Oregon strikes between top down and bottom up planning. 
 
•  Criticisms of Oregon’s Approach 
 
Lack of Data 
 
The lack of hard data places a significant limitation on scholars’ ability to discuss Oregon’s growth 
management system (Howe 1994, 275).  Oregon’s lack of a database on land use patterns and changes is one 
of the greatest shortcomings of the system.  Howe proposes a research agenda consisting of monitoring, 
evaluation, applied research and visionary research.  Some steps have been taken by DLCD toward 
formulating a research agenda, but it is uncertain whether sufficient support will be forthcoming from the 
legislature.  The following sections will discuss the issues of Oregon’s approach and policy implementation, 
but the reader should keep in mind that more research is needed before final conclusions can be reached. 
 
Implementation Problems 
 
Implementation in Oregon has been “a fascinating story of conflict, negotiation and compromise” (Howe 
1993, 65).  Interest groups have played big role in defining policy implications and marshalling support 
(particularly, 1000 Friends of Oregon).  There are many examples of uneven local plan enforcement.  1000 
Friends serves to mitigate this with their willingness to take action, and other new organizations are forming 
to ensure the process works, (e.g. the Urban Land Use Council of Oregon has been formed to promote 
development inside UGBs). 
 
Protecting Farm and Forest Lands 
Howe argues that based on what data is available, farmland protection policies appear to have been largely 
successful (Howe 1993, 68).  Evidence supporting this view is that land values in rural areas tend to reflect 
agricultural, not development prices.  However, a recent study attempting to determine if Oregon’s land use 
planning system was effective in protecting farms and open space from converting to other uses produced 
uncertain results (Kline, 12).  The study looked at conversion of private-owned forest and farmland to 
developed uses.  It showed that the likelihood of plots being developed within UGBs in western Oregon 
increased following adoption of mandated land use plans.  This result is positive, since part of the purpose of 
UGBs is to concentrate development inside their boundaries.  However, the likelihood that land will be 
developed outside of UGBs has in fact remained the same as before growth management was in place.  This 
could imply that the program has not succeeded in slowing rural development.  However, these results are not   58
conclusive, since they could be reflecting the fact that land close to urban areas has always been more likely to 
develop, and that there were therefore not enough instances of development in rural areas prior to land use 
planning to detect a statistically significant difference (Kline, 13).  It remains uncertain whether growth 
management has been effective in protecting rural areas.   
 
In any case, there is room for improvement.  Between 1985-89, 5 percent of development in Portland area was 
outside UGB, and in three other metro areas exurban development ranged from 24 percent to 57 percent.  
LCDC has responded to these concerns by requiring local governments and Metro to designate urban reserve 
area that will be incorporated into UGB within 50 years.  These areas come with rules guiding parcelization of 
land, intended to prevent obstacles to future expansion. 
 
Meeting Density Goals in the Portland Area 
As discussed in Section II, density targets have not been reached in the Portland area (according to one study, 
actual densities ranged between 33 percent and 75 percent of allowed densities) (Howe 1993, 70).  This 
failure led to discussion of minimum densities for the Portland area, which have been incorporated into the 
2040 Framework Plan.  However, there are no minimum density requirements outside of the Portland area.  
Though sufficient data is not available, it seems likely that other rapidly growing Oregon cities (e.g., Eugene, 
Bend) are having similar difficulties in increasing density. 
 
Missing Tools 
 
Along with required local plans, UGBs are the mainstay of Oregon’s controls on land development and the 
key tool used to prevent urban sprawl.  However, though UGBs define the border between urban and rural 
land, they do little to influence the shape or location of development within their boundaries.  Easley argues 
that by themselves UGBs do not achieve most of the goals of the Oregon growth management program 
(Easley, 2).  Because UGBs place limits on the supply of developable land, UGB success depends on 
achieving minimum densities (Easley, 14).  Indeed, failure to reach target densities in the Portland area 
created the need for the region’s late 1990s UGB expansions.  This points to a need for enactment of other, 
related policies to direct the density and type of development within the boundary.  As Weitz and Moore 
argue (above), achievement of several of Oregon’s goals will depend largely on contiguity of new 
development.  The 2040 Framework Plan incorporates this concept by placing emphasis on growth centers 
and corridors.  However, this is a new role for Metro and the results are not yet known.  The power to enforce 
its regional growth plans is new.  Metro may need new tools and additional capacity to handle this 
responsibility.  Furthermore, in the rest of the state there is a continuing lack of tools to promote contiguity.   
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Inadequate Support 
 
The ability of LCDC, Metro and other growth management agencies is limited by their budgets.  Budgets, in 
turn, are subject to fluctuations as a result of political shifts, economic changes or (in the case of Metro) “no” 
votes on bond referendums.  An unreliable and insufficient funding stream is a major obstacle to monitoring 
and enforcing even the existing system, let alone any expansion, addition of new approaches or research 
efforts.  LCDC receives state funding, but has historically been inadequately funded and understaffed (Nelson 
and Duncan, 23).  According to Nelson and Duncan, the result has been slow progress on goal attainment.  
For example, the process of reviewing and acknowledging local plans proved to be more onerous and took 
longer than had been anticipated (Howe 1993, 66).  Again, not enough resources were allocated for the job, 
prompting suggestions that the system be reviewed. 
 
Vertically integrated?   
 
As discussed in Section II, Oregon’s system is predicated on strong vertical integration between state agencies 
and local governments.  However, Armstrong and Jacobs caution that there are spots in the system that are 
vulnerable to inefficient relations between governmental institutions (Armstrong, 7).  The most vulnerable 
areas are those where the relationship between the state and local governments have become adversarial, such 
as in rural development regulations.  In such areas, consensus-building techniques might produce better 
results. 
 
Legalistic Approach 
 
Since 1973, the goal-setting process has largely occurred at the state level in a relatively top down fashion.  
This is a departure from practice prior to 1973, when local governments had wider discretion in setting goals.  
Now, though local governments can go beyond state goals, the emphasis is on demonstrating compliance 
(Howe 1993, 66).  The main avenue for resolving disputes is appeal to LUBA and the courts.  This has led to 
a pattern of court cases to set precedents and an emphasis on compliance.  Howe reports that some people 
complain that planning is becoming too legalistic—the province of lawyers, not planners.  This is a result of 
moving to a top down orientation in which enforcement from above is a possibility. 
 
Anti-rural Bias 
 
Rural politicians and residents criticize Oregon’s growth management system for a supposed bias against rural 
living (Howe 1993, 68).  The system is predicated on an untested bias that rural development will harm 
resource management.  Exception lands are meant to accommodate rural development, but designation of 
exception areas is based purely on the presence of previous development, not taking into account other factors   60
that affect suitability.  As is the case with criticisms of the system’s legalistic approach, the perceived anti–
rural bias is part of the “growing pains” of developing a more top down system. 
 
•  A Top Down Planning System, with a Strong Bottom Up Emphasis 
 
Balancing Market and Planning Considerations 
 
As discussed above, the Oregon system does not seek to limit or prevent growth, but to guide it.  UGBs are 
predicated this concept.  The legislature’s concern about placing too much pressure on the private sector, 
which would then be passed on to consumers, led to the requirement that UGBs encompass enough land for 
the next 20 years of growth.  Easley argues that for UGBs to be successful, they require that a sufficient 
market factor be built in (market factor is a term describing the amount of land within the boundary that is 
available for future development).  If the market factor is not sufficient, developers, businesses and housing 
consumers may suffer the effects of increasing prices or scarcity of land, and the growth boundary could be 
threatened (Easley, 10).  Therefore, the success of planning efforts depends on finding the proper balance 
between top down control and bottom up market initiative. 
 
Councilor Don Morissette (Metro District 2) articulates this logic:  “While the UGB is easy to defend 
politically, there are tradeoffs to this popular but narrow approach.  I fear that land and housing costs will be 
driven up, hurting people economically and promoting a new kind of sprawl by increasing long-distance 
commutes from surrounding areas” (2040 Framework, Fall 1996/Winter 1997, 14).  The concern that 
government interventionist policies can have unintended consequences is characteristic of Oregon and the 
U.S. as a whole.  One commonly cited negative consequence is an alleged exclusionary element to UGBs.  
Lang and Hornburg argue that Portland’s growth management system primarily benefits property owners by 
increasing the value of their investment (Lang, 8).  They liken the Portland system to a “giant homeowners’ 
association” with a UGB serving the function that a wall around a subdivision would serve—to keep out 
people with lower incomes.  This logic can pit affordability advocates (and advocates of other social issues) 
against the growth management system and can lead to a watering down of land use regulations.  Oregon has 
taken steps to incorporate equity concerns into the state system, notably through housing policies.   
 
Conducting a balancing act between various sectors is necessary.  Still, it can be argued that pitting various 
sectoral claims against each other prevents the formulation of strong substantive goals, fosters reluctance to 
depart from the status quo and narrows the range of policy choices available.  Because state goals are only a 
framework, local communities need to engage in normative discussions of how they want to grow.  This logic 
suggests a need for stronger planning.  Taking the example of the Portland region, Lang and Hornburg point 
out that increases in land costs (caused by land regulations) will not have a negative impact on housing costs 
as long as builders can compensate with smaller lots and denser housing.  However, there is some limit to how   61
much density is desirable.  Therefore, they argue that Portland needs to decide what its ideal density should 
be, then plan UGB extensions at that density (Lang, 8).  This would suggest a well-supported, comprehensive 
planning process for the Portland area and a willingness to make binding plans (much like the 2040 
Framework Plan process).  Placing too much emphasis on accommodating the private sector precludes usage 
of strong planning tools that could prove to be effective, when used in combination with correspondingly 
strong tools to mitigate potential unintended consequences (e.g., stronger housing policies for low income 
people).  The question then becomes one of political feasibility—will citizens support a strengthened planning 
process?  This issue is discussed below. 
 
Is Planning People Led, or Expert Led? 
 
Oregon’s Goal 1 is “To ensure the opportunity for citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning 
process” (Howe 1993, 64).  This emphasis on citizen participation is highly visible in the Oregon system.  
Oregon’s growth management system has been legitimized by voter support several times, as has Metro.  
Metro is highly oriented toward following citizen leadership.  From its creation in 1978, Metro has been 
delegated its power directly from the citizenry.  When Metro assumed home rule powers in 1992 and adopted 
a charter to undertake the Region 2040 process, it was, again, instructed to do so by the region’s voters (Metro 
Facts, Fall 1998).  The process started with an intensive effort “aimed at getting answers to some basic 
livability questions from the people of the region”.  With language that connotes the relationship between a 
firm and its clients, Metro refers to a “dual consumer demand for using land efficiently and creating “good 
density” through innovative, quality design”.  Metro also answers to the region’s 27 local governments.  This 
orientation to planning agencies as public servants implementing the will of the people is indicative of a 
system that is highly bottom up and people led, rather than expert led.    
 
Public Support for Growth Management 
 
Lang and Hornburg argue that the system accrues additional support as a result of its own momentum—when 
people live in higher density neighborhoods, they take a greater stake in transit systems and other community 
infrastructure, whereas in other cities the city-suburb divide means support is divided as well (Lang, 8).  
“Portland’s UGB is one means to ensure that even the edge of the region still looks, feels, and 
correspondingly, thinks like the center” (Lang, 8).  According to this logic, as long as voters and politicians 
are happy with its results, growth management institutions will continue to receive support.  The problem is, 
this also leaves little insulation for the planning system from shifting political movements.  Dependant as it is 
on legitimization from the public and approval of bond measures, the growth management institution must 
employ a cautious approach and may be subject to erosion of the strength of its policies.  On the other hand, it 
may mean that Oregon planning agencies are in better touch with the wishes of citizens. 
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Each session sees a number of bills targeting growth management.  The current state legislature is particularly 
aggressive, with several bills designed to weaken measures and place more emphasis on property rights 
(Robertson, 1).  Robert Liberty, Director of 1000 Friends of Oregon described the last legislative session as 
the worst in the last 30 years.  Proponents of these measures see them as eliminating red tape or rectifying 
inequities for landowners.  “Why so many bills?  It is an awareness that’s growing in our state about the 
inability of property owners to use their property,” said Sen. Veral Tarno (Robertson, 2).  Oregon growth 
management does benefit from strong public support, making it unlikely to be defeated directly.  However, it 
stands at risk of being watered down. 
 
Voters have also directly denied support to some growth management policies through bond referendums 
(Abbott, 26).  Abbott speculates that the recent statewide “no” vote on light-rail could signal “the first fracture 
in the city-suburb coalition, fallout from political infighting in Clackamas County, general anti-spending 
sentiment, downstate response to environmentally oriented ballot measures that could be seen as anti-rural—
or all of the above” (Abbott, 26).  This may be a time when proponents of growth management need to be 
especially vigilant and active in both public education and defense of the system’s achievements.  Such 
dangers are indicative of the fragility of the system. 
 
Abbott warns that unheeded voices can be the beginnings of movements that can eventually become powerful 
(Abbott, 37).  The Portland style of consensual decision-making leaves little room for dissent on basic values.  
Already, most elections pit outer neighborhood “antitax populists” against central neighborhood “quality of 
life liberals” (Abbott, 37).  “The most likely counter coalition [opposing growth management] would combine 
antitax populists with local activists mobilized to defend moderate-income neighborhoods against higher 
densities and social changes” (O’Toole cited in Abbott, 38).  Examples of the seeds of such coalitions can be 
found—Forbes reports that leaders of the Multnomah Village neighborhood  have organized against what 
they say is a city attempt to increase density by 20 percent—a policy in line with Metro’s Region 2040 plan 
(Ferguson, 5).   
 
According to Leo, resistance to growth management tends to come from two groups who think growth and 
other goals are mutually exclusive (Leo, 18).  One group is the advocates of low-income neighborhoods 
subject to pressure from rising costs (an example is Portland Organizing Project), who have largely been 
pushed to the sidelines in Portland. The other group is property rights advocates (Oregonians In Action 
frequently speaks for this group) who pursue landowner compensation for restrictions on land usage.  Though 
the two groups have drastically different political outlooks, both work outside the coalition system to pursue 
their goals.  Ironically, both groups could effectively weaken growth management by pursuing their own 
disparate goals. 
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•  Conclusion 
 
This section will briefly sketch current shifts in the distribution of decision-making authority between the tiers 
of government and between government and the private sector.  Figure 6 provides a sketch view of the current 
distribution of power among the main governmental actors and the private sector in the Portland metropolitan 
area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The national level is only indirectly involved in land use planning.  Therefore, they have little power to direct 
it (however, many national policies have a strong connection with land use patterns).   
 
The position of the state government for planning appears to have remained fairly stable over the course of the 
1990s.  The state creates a loose framework for growth, leaving the specifics to local governments.  It also 
monitors and occasionally takes enforcement action. 
 
Metro’s position has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s.  The 2040 Framework Plan and 
Metro’s home rule charter represent steps toward a strengthened position for planning in the Portland area. 
 
In the Portland region, local governments have given up a share of autonomy to Metro.  They now are 
required to comply not only with state goals, but also with the regional plan. 
 
Finally, it could be argued that the private sector has given up a share of autonomy.  Development is now 
subject to additional control as a result of coordinated government policies in the Portland region.  However, 
the private sector still occupies a leading position in formulating growth management policies.  Also, it could 
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be argued that regional cooperation would benefit the private sector by further streamlining the development 
approval process. 
 
The process is characterized by negotiation, coalition building and finding a package of policies that can strike 
a balance between the various goals of the state.  The last decade saw a reassessment of planning in the 
Portland area. Rather than renouncing the planning system, policy-makers responded by strengthening 
regional planning powers.  Though the changes to Metro’s mission and powers were significant, the process 
has been characterized by gradual evolution.  Now, Metro is in a position to try out its increased authority and 
to explore the option of incorporating new tools into it approach.  However, given the citizen-led nature of 
Oregon and Portland planning, Metro will have to tread lightly, careful not to overstep what the public sees as 
its bounds.   65
 
 
CHAPTER 3:  Theoretical Comparison and Opportunities for 
Learning 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This exploration of two very different planning systems has revealed some common issues.  To start, both 
have “successful” interventionist governments.  Next, both systems share some common problems, such as an 
implementation gap.  Finally, both wrestle with common theoretical issues.  This chapter will review the key 
commonalities between the two systems, including shared challenges, then discuss both in terms of several 
theoretical issues.  Finally, the paper will conclude with an attempt to make recommendations for both 
systems.   In fact, the realm for mutual learning is vast and could take any number of forms.  Therefore, the 
recommendations are intended to create a groundwork for future exchanges. 
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I.  Some Common Features 
 
•  General International Trends 
 
Political shifts in the last two decades have followed similar patterns in both countries.  In the Netherlands, the 
emphasis since the mid-1980s has been on decentralization, liberalization and deregulation of the spatial 
planning, environmental and housing sectors.  Though the central government has maintained a strong role, 
the regional and local levels are increasingly responsible for formulating policy.  In the U.S., the 1980s saw a 
decline in federal spending on affordable housing (Connerly, 185) and declining funding for substate regional 
agencies (DeGrove and Metzer, 9).  The tax revolt of the early 1990s reduced property tax revenues  
(Nicholas, 200).  National level intervention has continued to be considered undesirable in the U.S.  
Paralleling the trend in Netherlands, emphasis is placed on local and state policy-making.  In both places, the 
late 1980s and the 1990s have been somewhat turbulent for planning issues.  In the Netherlands, planning 
underwent considerable reforms.  In Oregon, while voters approved stronger powers for Metro, the legislature 
has tended to take an anti-planning stance.   
 
•  Similar Governmental Structure for Planning 
 
The two systems are structured in a similar fashion.  Both systems employ a system of interlinked 
governmental bodies in which the higher levels create a policy framework and monitor policy implementation 
by the levels below.   Figure 4 (on page 33) depicts the mutually dependent relationships between all the 
actors that impact on the built environment.  A similar diagram could also be made for Oregon.  The 
differences would be the relative size and importance of the various levels.  The primary difference would be 
that in Oregon, the private sector has a larger role than in the Netherlands. 
 
•  The Implementation Gap 
 
There is a parallel between Oregon’s Region 2040 planning process and the Netherlands’ Vinex.  Both plans 
were formulated because policy-makers perceived that prior practices were failing to meet goals.   This 
perception prompted the shifts in both places that moved the two systems closer together in terms of 
government control.  Both perceived that there was an implementation gap, but they reacted in very different 
ways.  The Netherlands concluded that there was too much government control, while Oregon concluded that 
there was not enough. 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 discussed the perceived gap between planning and implementation.  In Oregon, density 
targets were not reached, sprawl-type development was seen within Portland’s UGB and growth still occurred 
outside the UGB.  In the Netherlands, despite a strong effort by the national planning agency, growth has not   67
stopped in restricted areas such as the Green Heart.  Also, the ABC Location policy failed to produce a high 
level of compliance.  Though the situation would undoubtedly have been worse without the planning controls, 
substantive goal achievement in both countries has been less than ideal.   
 
It should be noted that it may be unfair to judge the success of each system by its own goals.  First, there is a 
lack of data about the results of the Oregon program.  Second, Dutch goals are probably more ambitious than 
Oregon’s.  Leaving aside the many indicators of the success of the Dutch system (see Chapter 1), a visit to any 
Dutch city will demonstrate that planning indeed has a strong impact.  The criticisms leveled at planning 
performance are simply judging each system by its own standards.  Oregon may be doing as much as is 
politically feasible, but clearly the standards in the Netherlands are higher.  Because the focus here is not to 
explore goal attainment itself but rather the systemic responses to perceived problems, this discussion will 
proceed under the assumption that each place should be judged by its own standards (further comparative 
research into the validity and scope of goal-setting itself would be valuable). 
 
Both systems have already attempted to address the implementation gap through reform of their approaches.  
Interestingly, they both changed the amount, and redistributed, government control over development.  In 
Oregon, policy-makers perceived that controls were not strong or coordinated enough, and chose to 
concentrate authority at the regional level.  In the Netherlands, policy-makers perceived that controls were too 
strong, limiting market and local government freedom, and chose to reduce controls and deconcentrate 
authority.  We return here to the original premise of this paper—that these two systems are moving closer 
together, but from opposite directions.  Now we come to a central question—will the changes both systems 
are making hit the target—the implementation gap?   
 
It has now been seven or eight years since the advent of Vinex and the adoption of home rule by Metro (but 
only three since Metro’s 2040 Framework Plan was adopted).  In the Netherlands, Voogd reports that these 
reforms were not very successful at addressing the problems targeted, and in Oregon the results of the reforms 
of the 1990s are not yet known.  However, we can speculate that Metro will not be completely successful in 
leading the Portland area upstream against national trends toward deconcentration and car mobility.  The 
implementation gap is proving to be a formidable foe.  What type of change, if any, would be needed to 
address the alleged implementation gap?  Is there a real problem?  The answer may be both yes and no. 
 
Ways of Judging Planning Success 
 
Voogd argues that there are two ways to evaluate the success of planning efforts.  The traditional one 
is to see if substantive targets were reached (Vinex was largely unsuccessful in these terms) (Voogd 
2000, 20).  The second is to judge the plan’s effectiveness in terms of influencing political behavior (a 
similar concept to plan performance as discussed by Faludi and Van der Valk, 1994).  This he refers to   68
as “the performance” of a plan.  By these terms, Voogd argues that Vinex was very successful as a 
marketing tool of ideas.  The same can be said of Oregon’s planning efforts, which have undoubtedly 
done a great deal in influencing political behavior.  In these terms, Oregon’s state planning system and 
Metro’s Region 2040 planning process have probably performed well. 
 
Mastop offers another way to think about the implementation gap.  He suggests the possibility that a 
lot of “implementation” could take place without or alongside planning and policy-making (Mastop, 
809).  Thus, planning does not have to control everything in order to be successful (as Voogd argues, it 
may be successful in other ways).  In fact, Mastop disputes that the performance of Dutch spatial 
planning up to the 1980s was really poor (this logic could be extended to Vinex’s performance as 
well).  Despite criticisms, the basic planning approach was reaffirmed in the 1985 revisions (ibid., 
813).  The change was in terms of style (the system became more liberal, selective, communicative, 
adaptive and intercorporative).  In a broad view, the system has been “quite robust and at the same 
time flexible”.  This offers strong evidence that in 1985 and subsequently the majority of Dutch 
policy-makers did not believe that the implementation gap was indicative of a fundamental failure of 
the system. 
 
This logic may or may not apply to the same extent to Oregon.  Because of lack of data, it is not clear 
how well Oregon and Metro have performed.  However, the same logic would probably be a valid 
defense of the system even in the case that substantive goals were not being reached.  Voogd and 
Mastop’s arguments (as well as Faludi and Van der Valk’s discussion below) identify planning not as 
a blueprint, but as a method of framing decisions.  Thus, plan performance can be judged based on the 
plan’s success in informing the decision-making process, not solely on substantive goal attainment. 
 
These arguments on the one hand suggest that planning has value in terms other than achievement of 
substantive goals, and on the other question whether the gap is as bad as feared.  However, this issue cannot 
be entirely sidestepped in either of these ways.  Though plans can have value as framing devices for decision-
making and “implementation” can take place in ways other than through formal planning, there is clearly still 
a need for the traditional approach to plan assessment in terms of substantive goal attainment.  One underlying 
question in the following section on planning models will be whether something can be learned that could 
help to address this concern. 
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II. Planning  Approaches 
 
In this section, Oregon and the Netherlands will be compared in terms of various types of planning 
approaches.  These approaches are each central to the differences between Oregon and the Netherlands, and 
offer opportunities for them to learn from each other.  In the conclusion, some suggestions will be offered for 
both systems. 
 
•  Market Orientation 
 
Limitations Planning Places on the Free Market 
 
A fundamental criticism of Vinex is that its policies are too limiting on the freedom of choice for local 
governments, firms and consumers (Huis in’t Veld).  This argument applies to government land intervention 
in general, and was leveled against previous Dutch growth strategies as well.  The Fourth Report and Vinex 
took steps to incorporate a “more selective market-oriented approach” (Mastop, 807).  However, Vinex is still 
criticized from the perspective of local government and the private sector for not allowing enough flexibility.  
The argument that the Dutch economy is being drastically undercut is belied by the long history of strong 
government, necessitated by the land and water, and by the current strength of the Dutch economy (the 
Netherlands is a wealthy nation and the world’s third largest exporter).  Nonetheless, current trends are toward 
allowing the private sector a freer hand. 
 
Detractors of Oregonian planning use the same criticisms.  Nivola points out that by concentrating growth, 
planners in Oregon will inevitably drive up the cost of land (Nivola, 61).  This, he argues, has already begun 
to discourage business investment in the state.  However, Beatley argues that dense, compact cities may 
actually enhance a city’s competitiveness (Beatley, 31).  Oregon has been able to harness the support of key 
private sector actors.  For its part, the Home Builders Association of Metropolitan Portland has been a strong 
supporter of growth management (Leo, 13).  The group has shown willingness to join the opposition, but as 
long as the system allows speedy approvals with understood rules, they support it and go along with density 
and housing type policies.  Local developers also benefit from their familiarity with Oregon’s regulations 
since it gives them an advantage over competition from other cities.  While in the long-term concerns about 
limiting the market may become important, currently the system enjoys strong private sector support.   
 
While both systems place emphasis on reaching a balance between market and other considerations, Oregon’s 
system is much more oriented to meeting market demands.  The contrast is evident in the approaches each 
country adopts to land development.  In the Netherlands, regulations play a key role.  In Oregon, incentives 
are much more emphasized. 
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Current thinking in the Netherlands is that planning should develop the type of private sector involvement and 
leadership that characterizes Oregon’s planning system.  In Oregon, the coalition supporting growth 
management incorporates the private sector.  They support the system because they believe that they can gain 
by it.   Thus, for the Netherlands to emulate Oregon’s position, planners will have to convince the private 
sector that the system benefits them.  This may be difficult to do, given the limitations that planning places on 
land development there.  In contrast, Oregon’s system is predicated on the need to adequately supply land for 
development (e.g., UGBs must incorporate a 20-year supply of land).  In Oregon, market considerations are at 
the forefront.  In the Netherlands, a host of issues are given equal weight.  How far would the Netherlands 
have to go before the private sector would buy into the planning system?  The distance could easily be further 
than most Dutch planners would think wise. 
 
•  Unintended Consequences of Controlling Growth 
 
Growth management programs effectively intervene in the market.  Such interventions can have unintended 
consequences.  Social scientists have frequently argued that growth management techniques create an 
artificial scarcity of land that drives up land costs, ultimately resulting in higher housing costs (Lang, 7).  
Institution of a UGB certainly does interrupt the trickle down of housing (a theory heavily relied upon in the 
U.S. as a way to provide affordable housing) by limiting the supply of new housing and creating stronger 
incentives to maintain the value of housing units (Abbott, 36).  Oregon, especially the Portland region, is 
indeed seeing rapidly increasing housing costs.  In contrast, the Netherlands’ strong housing support for low-
income people means that the equity issues of raising the cost of land do not attach themselves to spatial 
planning.  The problem in the Netherlands, in contrast, is not housing cost but the scarcity of the type of 
housing that people want—large, detached units.   
 
In fact, it is not entirely clear whether Oregonian growth management is to blame for increasing costs.  
Instead, the problem in Portland may be booming demand, largely caused by what could be a one-time influx 
of Californians (Abbott, 34).  Portland’s price increases are in fact in line with other growing communities 
like Albuquerque, Indianapolis, Charlotte, Denver and Salt Lake City which do not have growth management 
or UGBs in place.  Growth management could also have some affordability benefits.  Advocates assert that 
compact urban form promotes affordability through reduced infrastructures costs and through encouraging 
small lots, infill and accessory units (Abbott, 35).  Also, transportation savings for people with access to 
public transit can make up for higher housing costs. 
 
Another argument is that growth management is raising costs, but that that is its purpose.  Fischel points out 
that communities enact growth controls for a reason—often because they are facing high growth pressures 
(Fischel, 33).  The purpose of growth controls is to “create residential amenities, or, for that matter, prevent 
impending disamenities.  Hence the higher housing prices could be taken as evidence that growth controls do   71
what they are intended to do”.  Fischel would argue that the fact that growth control measures have been 
enacted in Portland is an indicator that the perceived benefits of protection outweigh the costs (Fischel, 44).  
Indeed, the Portland area appears to be enjoying the effects of a strong economy resulting from the 
concentration of investment in the center city due to growth management techniques. 
 
Nonetheless, housing affordability is a key issue in Oregon.  While the number of homeless people is 
increasing, downtown Portland lost 1,337 (26 percent) of affordable housing units from 1978 to 1994 (Leo, 3).  
According to the National Association of Home Builders, Portland is second only to San Francisco in housing 
unaffordability in terms of income (Ferguson, 3).  The same can be said of other growing cities in Oregon.  
Bend is one of the fastest growing Oregon cities and least affordable home markets (Berton, 1).  Whether or 
not growth management is the cause, housing affordability, especially for low-income people, is becoming a 
serious problem and a rhetorical weapon against the system.  But would it ever be possible for Oregon to 
emulate the strong subsidies for housing of the Netherlands?  Without a major shift in national political 
thinking, this seems unlikely but worthy of pursuing.  Oregon is doing what it can with land use regulations, 
however.  By raising densities and creating secondary units, they are increasing the stock of affordable units. 
 
In the Netherlands, spatial planning was born as a dependent of housing policy.  Housing was  “public enemy 
number one” in the Netherlands between World War II and the 1980s.  Everyone has the right to a place to 
live.  Fundamentally, housing is the responsibility of the central government.  Though they no longer directly 
provide the housing, they still facilitate its creation and guarantee it.  Housing needs are addressed directly 
within spatial planning policy.  Vinex requires that new developments include 30 percent subsidized housing.  
Therefore, it is not affordability but housing choice that is an issue.  The two systems are still worlds apart in 
terms of the strength of the sectors that also interact with spatial planning (the housing, welfare and 
environmental sectors). 
 
•  Flexibility versus Blueprint Planning 
 
Faludi and Van der Valk point to the “plan-led” nature of Dutch planning (Faludi, 9).  Dutch town 
extensions throughout the 20
th century have been systematically blueprint oriented (ibid., 44).  They 
argue that there is a conflict between looking at planning as a process of creating a blueprint for 
development, or as engaging in an ongoing process of decision-making.  In the Dutch system, plans 
are hybrids between blueprint documents and open documents allowing for the influence of non-
planners.  The blueprint aspect is logical considering that the Dutch environment requires a strong 
hand (ibid., 233).  However, Faludi and Van der Valk argue that blueprint planning is overly rigid and 
places too much emphasis on expert opinion (Faludi, 44).  One symptom of this is the overly detailed 
nature of the local land use plan, which they claim is “honoured more in the breach than in the 
observance” (ibid., 234).     72
 
Faludi and Van der Valk argue that planners should not think of plans as blueprints but instead as the 
frameworks for decisions, leaving room for the process of consensus-building (Faludi, 11).  Planners 
in the Netherlands have been very successful in organizing consensus around the rational definition of 
decision situations—actors agree on the bases for decisions (ibid., 12).  This process has not been 
upset by plan departures.  As long as the plan has informed decision-makers, it has done its job.  
Faludi and Van der Valk call for planners to be “the shapers of decision situations, not the preemptors 
of decisions”.  They praise what they describe as a “new consensus” regarding planning in the 
Netherlands (ibid., 239).  The crux is an emphasis on a “sociocratic view” under which, “planning is 
not an operation on society, but of society”.  Expertise is not the only source of legitimacy.  In this 
view, planning is needed to provide the structure that will then enable participants to take action.  
Thus, “performance, not conformance”, is the measure of a plan’s success. 
 
Damme et al concur with the idea that plans should be framing devices for decision-making.   They 
call for “robust plans”, “plans that are flexible and contain enough built-in opportunities and 
procedures to be adjusted to different future and not yet foreseeable implementing conditions, without 
losing [their] usefulness as a framing device…”(Damme, 841).  “Every plan should be drawn up with 
knowledge of the needs of developers, which include those of private developers, citizens, and public 
bodies…”  Plans should also be updated regularly to reflect current conditions and values.  Finally, 
they should give instructions “only where necessary…”.  In rural areas, a global plan aimed at 
maintaining the current situation would probably suffice.  As complexity increases with mixture of 
functions in an area, plans would need more detail.  Faludi and Van der Valk concur that plan reviews 
should be frequent.  They discuss the distinction between “espoused plans versus plans-in-use”.  The 
difference is that plans in use include all the factors that influence the decision process, not just the 
ideal as written in the plan.  From their perspective, the gap between these two can be narrowed by 
frequent plan reviews and updates (Faludi, 242).   
 
While Damme et al and Faludi and Van der Valk are undoubtedly right that frequent plan updates 
would be desirable in the Dutch system, it could be argued that this is easier said than done, because 
municipal resources are already spread thin (part of the reason plans are out of date currently) (Drenthe 
Interviews).  Without the frequent plan updates, it becomes dangerous for municipalities to have 
general plans, as then they may not be able to prevent undesired development (Huis in’t Veld 
Interview).  Therefore, success would depend on encouraging and supporting local plan-making and 
amendments. 
 
Voogd seems less enthusiastic about the current Dutch emphasis on consensus planning.  He observes that 
evidently, the old paradigm on the role of the central government as a dominant decision-maker which sets the   73
rules is “not realistic in a market-oriented society” (Voogd 2000, 21).  Nor is a “hierarchical steering model” 
that assumes decreasing power from top to bottom (see Figure 1).  Rather, it is more often the case that 
consensus-building occurs between governmental levels than that a higher government can enforce its will 
(see Figure 4).  This view points to consensus planning that will include “communication, persuasion, 
learning, mediation, negotiation and bargaining,” as a solution.  This is reminiscent of Oregon’s decision-
making system.  Oregon’s system fits into the description of a “sociocratic” planning system.  Oregon’s 
binding comprehensive plans are integrated vision documents. 
 
However, Voogd expresses the concern that opening the process too much, and allowing too much public 
input at the expense of expert opinion, could harm substantive planning goals.  In fact, he argues that the 
emphasis on consensus planning has already relaxed Dutch national planning goals too much, and he calls for 
more emphasis to be placed on implementation.  Voogd’s reasoning suggests that ultimately, exchanging a top 
down orientation for a participatory, bottom up one is a process that should not swing too far in either 
direction, but rather fluctuate somewhere within a moderate range. 
 
•  Top Down versus Bottom Up Planning  
 
Both the Dutch and Oregonian planning systems have been described as top down systems.  However, with a 
national plan for spatial development, the Netherlands is more top down than Oregon (though current 
decentralization trends are reducing this feature).  Several problems associated with a top down orientation 
have been identified by critics of both systems.   
 
Critics of both systems have cited a perceived mismatch between national (or state) policies and regional and 
local facts.  The argument is that plans made on a broad scale cannot take into account the firsthand 
knowledge available to local government and developers.  Dutch national policies under Vinex have largely 
been oriented toward the Randstad, and some argue they do not fit as well for other areas of the country 
(Drenthe Interviews).  Oregon’s planning also emphasizes urban issues.  Vinex took steps to decentralize 
planning control, and  the new plans written in the 1980s mostly had less emphasis on steering the decision-
making process (Mastop, 808).  Much attention was paid to attuning government policy with the interests of 
private organizations.  The Fourth Report was thus more open, selective and flexible.  However, in practice 
both systems combine top down and bottom up approaches.  The formulation of the planning vision is top 
down, but the initiative for development is bottom up (see Figure 4).  A good deal of the legitimacy of local 
plans comes from the fact that they are supported by higher authorities.  Therefore, the potential benefits of 
further decentralization in the Netherlands are questionable, while Oregon is in fact moving toward greater 
centralization. 
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•  The Role of Doctrines 
 
Faludi and Van der Valk place great importance on the role of doctrines.  Planning doctrines are 
metaphors that summarize the central ideas of some issue.  Doctrines are useful as a tool to generate 
consensus and inspire support—they are banners around which supporters can rally (Faludi, 232).  
However, Faludi and Van der Valk argue that doctrines should be adaptive, not rigid (ibid., 244).  In 
the Netherlands, the Randstad-Green Heart ideas are the most important doctrine.  In the 1990s, the 
Dutch national planning agency drew a rigid growth barrier around the Green Heart.  Faludi and Van 
der Valk fear that should that line be broken, it could have disastrous consequences for Dutch 
planning.   
 
Oregon offers a contrast with its fairly flexible approach to its most important doctrine—the UGB 
(UGBs are probably the best known and possibly most successful aspect of Oregon planning) (Nelson, 
25).  UGBs are fairly flexible.  They can accommodate exceptions and extensions as part of their 
normal functioning.  According to Faludi and Van der Valk’s logic, Oregon has been successful in 
creating planning doctrine that is useful as a tool to rally support, but is also flexible enough to survive 
setbacks.   
 
Though doctrines are useful, it could be dangerous for both systems to tie themselves too closely to 
their central doctrine.  If the doctrine falls, so would the planners.  Dutch planners may be trying to 
achieve the impossible in attempting to prevent growth in the highly demanded Green Heart.  Perhaps 
it would be more pragmatic to follow Oregon’s example and be more flexible.  However, this 
flexibility may mean that UGBs are weakened in substantive terms.  Planners in both places have to 
strike a balance between rigidity and flexibility, based largely on perceptions of political feasibility. 
 
•  Public Participation 
 
Oregon’s system is more explicitly bottom up than the Dutch system.  Faludi and Van der Valk argue that 
people in the Netherlands tend to agree that the workings of the nation in matters such as planning are too 
complex for everyone to address, and to desire that experts address them for them (Faludi, 7).  Oregon’s Goal 
1 calls for “the opportunity for citizens to be involved in all phases of the planning process, and requires local 
governments to create a committee for citizen involvement” (DLCD website).  Especially in the Portland area, 
citizens, non-profits, advocacy groups and the public have taken an activist role in planning and have 
collaborated with governmental agencies on a number of successful projects. The 2040 Framework process 
required significant public input (2040 Framework, Fall 1997, 3). 
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In the Netherlands, the tradition has been that a combination of expert opinion and input from non-planners is 
considered.  However, the Netherlands has recently tended to move toward allowing more public participation 
in plan-making.  The national spatial planning process follows a process called the Key Decision 
(planologische kernbeslissing), required by the 1986 Fourth Report (NSPA, 10).  It requires extensive public 
participation and consultations, public display, written questions from parliament, and advice from the 
Advisory Council for Spatial Planning at the first stage.  Then, it goes through revisions before going to the 
National Spatial Planning Commission for judgement.  Then two policy versions are submitted to the Second 
Chamber of parliament.  If they decide to approve any or all of it, it goes to the First Chamber for final 
approval and become legally binding.  This process, though it is used only for major decisions, is indicative of 
the trend toward encouraging the public to participate in plan-making.  
 
•  Sectoral Integration  
 
In Oregon, planning for transportation, economy, housing, environment and other issues is largely blended 
together in the planning process.  Up until Vinex, the Dutch planned on a sectoral basis.  Though this is still 
more the case, the Netherlands is increasingly integrating planning for sectors having spatial claims.  There is 
not much to say on this subject, except that there may be trade-offs in giving up sectoral plans for 
comprehensive ones.  Horizontal integration can amount to a loss of detail in the plans and a more general 
approach (Drenthe Interviews). 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
•  The Challenges to Sharing Approaches 
 
While many planning ideas from the Netherlands would be attractive to Oregonian planners, Nivola argues 
that without reassessing certain national policies, such as the tax structure and transportation funding, U.S. 
planners are in a very weak position.  “Within its limited reach, it is fair to say that U.S. urban policy cannot 
even faintly “Europeanize” the shape of American cities” (Nivola, 52).  On the other hand, introducing 
Oregonian market-based techniques in the Netherlands would mean making fundamental changes to Dutch 
planning and Dutch society.  However, there is a middle ground between the two systems.  The main benefit 
of exchange of information is that methods for reducing the implementation gap may be found.  However, 
neither approach offers a magic bullet.  Planners should take opportunities for exposure to both of these 
exemplary systems.   
 
The central challenge facing Dutch planning is to evolve new approaches suited to a free market 
system, without losing the concern for equity that characterizes Dutch society.  Allowing greater   76
market participation in shaping the built environment can undoubtedly have benefits.  However, the 
market obeys its own logic.  In areas with economic disadvantages, or in times of economic downturn, 
attracting investment will continue to be a challenge.  This applies both to competition between cities, 
and to divergent neighborhoods within urban areas.  The danger is that while the strong are getting 
stronger, the weak may also be getting weaker (Heins Interview).  It is to be expected, and even 
desired, that government and the market should engage in ongoing power exchanges, tailored to the 
needs at that time.  Planners should explore the opportunities available in adopting a more free market 
approach.  However, government intervention remains the best tool to counterbalance the profit motive 
and address equity concerns.   It would be a mistake to allow both real and perceived implementation 
problems or a slavish reliance on the market to persuade the Netherlands to renounce that approach. 
 
For Oregon, the challenge is similar.  Oregon is seeking to guide growth in order to achieve goals covering 
most aspects of the built environment.  In a free market context, it is a challenge to find techniques that can 
balance the weight placed on market considerations.  An example is the challenges posed by housing 
affordability.  The affordability issue may be impossible to address sufficiently solely through land use 
regulations.  Oregon may increasingly have to consider enacting approaches that concentrate sufficient power 
at the state and regional levels to counterbalance the private sector and the limited vision of local 
governments.  Given time, Oregon may take additional steps that lead it to look a little more like the Dutch 
planning system.  
 
Despite the many differences between these two systems, the fact remains that they are moving closer 
together.  Even if no concrete techniques make the transition across the Atlantic, it is possible for planners 
from both systems to explore the functioning of the other system as an example of what to each is currently a 
distant destination, sometimes hoped and worked for.  Planners should realize that no radical shift in the way 
they work is going to magically solve tough problems such as the implementation gap.  An exchange of 
information and a discussion of approaches could be quite fruitful.  Inevitably, and positively, such a 
discussion will ultimately end up addressing the central theoretical issues reviewed in Chapter 3.  Planning 
approaches are undoubtedly deep-seated within their cultural context.  However, new ideas have always found 
their way into the accepted ways of thinking.  The broad basis of common goals and issues shared by Oregon 
and the Netherlands have created fertile ground for new ideas to be exchanged and bear fruit, or the 
opportunity to catch a glimpse of unintended outcomes before their causes have taken root.   77
 
Bibliography: 
 
 
Abbott, Carl, “The Portland Region:  Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other—and Often Agree”, 
Housing Policy Debate, v8 i1, 1997, pp.11-45 
 
Armstrong, Thomas D. and Harvey M. Jacobs, “Centralized Growth Management Policy and Local Land-Use 
Decision Making:  Learning from Oregon’s Experience”, Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, v51 n4, 
July-August 1996, pp.285(3)  
 
Beatley, Timothy, Green Urbanism—Learning from European Cities, Island Press, Washington D.C. 
2000 
 
Berton, Brad, “Big Land-Use Headaches Land in Central Oregon”, Business Journal-Portland, v14 n28, Sep. 
5, 1997, pp.2A(3) 
 
Bollens, Scott, “Integrating Environmental and Economic Policies at the State Level”, in Growth 
Management:  The Planning Challenge of the 1990’s, edited by Jay Stein, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 
California 1993, pp.143-161  
 
Connerly, Charles and Nancy A. Muller, “Evaluating Housing Elements in Growth Management 
Comprehensive Plans”, in Growth Management:  The Planning Challenge of the 1990’s, edited by Jay Stein, 
Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California 1993, pp.185-199 
 
Damme, Leonard van, M Galle, M Pen-Soetermeer, K Verdaas, “Improving the performance of local 
land-use plans”, Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 1997, vol. 24, pp. 833-844. 
 
DeGrove, John M. and Patricia M. Metzger, “Growth Management and Integrated Roles of State, Regional 
and Local Governments”, in Growth Management:  The Planning Challenge of the 1990’s, edited by Jay 
Stein, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California 1993, pp.3-17 
 
Easley, Gail V.,  Staying Inside the Lines: Urban Growth Boundaries, American Planning Association, 
Chicago, IL 1992 
 
Environmental Policy of the Netherlands, An Introduction, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment, Department of Information and External Relations, The Hague 1997 
 
Faludi, Andreas and Arnold van der Van der Valk, Rule and Order Dutch Planning Doctrine in the 
Twentieth Century, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1994 
 
Ferguson, Tim W., “Down With the Burbs!  Back to the City!”, Forbes, v159 n9, May 5, 1997, pp.142(6) 
 
Housing In the Netherlands, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Department 
for Information and International Relations, The Hague 1997 
 
(Howe, 1993) Howe, Deborah, “Growth Management in Oregon”, in Growth Management:  The Planning 
Challenge of the 1990’s, edited by Jay Stein, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California 1993, pp.61-75 
 
(Howe, 1994) Howe, Deborah, Ä Research Agenda for Oregon Planning:  Problems and Practice for the 
1990s”, in Planning the Oregon Way:  A Twenty Year Evaluation, edited by Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe and 
Sy Adler, Oregon State University Press, Corvallis, Oregon 1994, pp.275-290 
 
Kline, Jeffrey D. and Ralph J. Alig, “Does Land Use Planning Slow the Conversion of Forest and Farm 
Lands?”, Growth and Change v30 i1, Winter 1999, pp.3(2)   78
 
Lang, Robert E. and Steven P. Hornburg, “Planning Portland Style:  Pitfalls and Possibilities”, Housing Policy 
Debate, v8 i1, 1997, pp.1-8  
 
Lassar, Terry J.,  Carrots and Sticks:  New Zoning Downtown, Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C., 1989 
 
Leo, Christopher, “Regional Growth Management Regime:  The Case of Portland, Oregon”, Journal of Urban 
Affairs, v20 i4, 1998, pp.363-395 
 
Mastop, Hans, “Performance in Dutch spatial planning: an introduction”, Environment and Planning 
B: Planning and Design 1997, vol. 24, pp. 807-813.   
 
Miller, Brian K., “The Law of Land Use”, Business Journal-Portland, v16 i17, June 18, 1999, pp.19(2) 
 
Morris, Marya, “Portland’s LUTRAQ Program”, Planning, v62 n4, April 1996, pp.12(1) 
 
National Spatial Planning Agency, Spatial Planning in the Netherlands—Bodies and Instruments, Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Department of Information and External Relations, The 
Hague 1996 
 
(Nelson and Duncan) Nelson, Arthur C. and James B. Duncan,  Growth Management Principles and Practices, 
American Planning Association (Planners Press), Chicago, IL 1995 
 
(Nelson and Moore) Nelson, Arthur C. and Terry Moore, “Assessing urban growth management—The Case 
of Portland, Oregon, the USA’s Largest Urban Growth Boundary”, Land Use Policy, v10 n4, 1993, pp.293-
302 
 
(Nelson) Nelson, Arthur C., “Oregon’s Urban Growth Boundary Policy as a Landmark Planning Tool”, in 
Planning the Oregon Way:  A Twenty Year Evaluation, edited by Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe and Sy Adler, 
Oregon State University Press, Corvallis, Oregon 1994, pp.25-48 
 
NEPP,  National Environmental Policy Plan 2, Summary, The Environment:  Today’s Touchstone, Ministry 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Department of Information and External Relations, The 
Hague 1994 
 
Nicholas, James C., “Paying for Growth:  Creative and Innovative Solutions”, in Growth Management:  The 
Planning Challenge of the 1990’s, edited by Jay Stein, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California 1993, 
pp.200-216 
 
Nivola, Pietro S., Laws of the Landscape:  How Policies Shape Cities in Europe and America, The Brookings 
Institute, Washington, D.C.1999 
 
Oliver, Gordon, “Oregon Metro Faces the Ultimate Test”, Planning, v62 n6, June 1996, pp.11(1) 
 
Robertson, Lance, “Oregon Lawmakers Debate Land-Use Legislation”, Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business 
News, June 3, 1999 
 
Stein, Jay (editor),  Growth Management:  The Planning Challenge of the 1990’s, Sage Publications, Newbury 
Park, California 1993 
 
Stephenson, Bruce R., “A Vision of Green:  Lewis Mumford’s Legacy in Portland, Oregon”, Journal of the 
American Planning Association, v65 i3, Summer 1999, pp.259-278 
   79
Sullivan, Edward J., “The Legal Evolution of the Oregon Planning System”, in Planning the Oregon Way:  A 
Twenty Year Evaluation, edited by Carl Abbott, Deborah Howe and Sy Adler, Oregon State University Press, 
Corvallis, Oregon 1994, pp.49-70 
 
Van Uum, Edwin, “Spatial Planning Scenarios for the Netherlands”, Journal of Economic and Social 
Geography, 1998 Vol. 89, Number 1, pp.106-116 
 
Voogd (1997),  Voogd, H, “Planning conformations that shaped Dutch urban areas”, IN:  The 
Management of Urban Change in Europe, Edited by A. Dingsdale and P.J.M. van Steen, Faculty of 
Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, The Netherlands, 1997, pp.73-85. 
 
Voogd (2000),  Voogd, H., “Urban Planning in the Netherlands: The Gap between Planning Concepts and 
Reality”, paper presented at the URBE Conference “Equity, Justice and Competitiveness in the City”, Vila 
Real, Portugal, January 29, 2000 
 
Weitz, Jerry and Terry Moore, “Development Inside Urban Growth Boundaries:  Oregon’s Empirical 
Evidence of Contiguous Urban Form”, Journal of the American Planning Association, v64 n4, Autumn 1998, 
pp.424-441 
 
 
Interviews: 
 
Drenthe Interviews:  Drenthe Provincial Planners (Jan Buiten, Liesbeth Jorritsma, N.A. v.d. Nadort, 
Willem Huizing, L. de Wit-Ybema), Interviews conducted February 10, 17 and 18, 2000  
 
Heins Interview,  Gerard Heins, Lecturer for the Department of Spatial Sciences, RUG, Interview 
conducted March 7, 2000 
 
Huis in’t Veld Interview, Laurens Huis in’t Veld, Senior Beleidsmede-werker Ruimtelijke Economie en 
Verkeer, Gemeente Groningen, Interview conducted March 6, 2000 
 
 
Web Sites: 
 
Oregon’s Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD), 
http://www.budget.net/~primrose/goals.htm 
 
Oregon’s Land Use Board of Appeals Home Page, http://luba.state.or.us/ 
 
Portland Metro website:  www.metro-region.org 
 
 
Newsletters: 
 
Metro 2040 Framework Plan Update, Fall 1995/Winter 1996, Metro, 600 NE Grand Ave., Portland, OR 
97232 
 
Metro 2040 Framework Plan Update, Fall 1996/Winter 1997, Metro, 600 NE Grand Ave., Portland, OR 
97232 
  
Metro 2040 Framework Plan Update, Fall 1997, Metro, 600 NE Grand Ave., Portland, OR 97232 
 
Metro Facts Fall 1998, Newsletter produced by Metro Regional Services, Metro, 600 NE Grand Ave., 
Portland, OR 97232 
   80
Urban Growth Boundary, Newsletter produced by Metro Growth Management Department, Metro, 600 NE 
Grand Ave., Portland, OR 97232 
 
 